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ABSTRACT
The main task of the present thesis is to clarify Leibniz’s conception of the relation 
between God and creatures, in contrast with Spinozism. Before performing this task, I 
shall show that the relation between God and creatures corresponds in the 
monadological system to the relation between the soul and the body, and that these two 
relations are both ontological—by which I mean that they are essentially concerned with 
the distinction between a being and its being. In order to explicate these two relations 
properly, I shall adopt the Heideggerian ontology as a method of the interpretation of 
Leibniz.
The present thesis has three parts. In Part One I shall determine the relation between 
the soul and the body with recourse to Heidegger’s ontological difference, and show 
that this relation corresponds to the relation between God and creatures (or the world as 
the sum of created beings). In Part Two I shall show more clearly how these two 
relations correspond. In order to do so, I shall determine in more detail the relation 
between the soul and the body, by grasping it as the relation among the dominant monad, 
its body and the subordinate monads. This latter relation will be explicated again by the 
ontological difference. In Part Three I shall treat of a paradox which follows from the 
correspondence between the God-world relation and the soul-body relation; that is to 
say, if God is to the world as the soul is to its body, it follows that he is the world-soul 
which has the world as its body—the doctrine which Leibniz consistently rejects, 
ascribing it particularly to Spinoza. I shall show that this doctrine itself does not 
contradict the theory of monads. It is in this part that the contrast is made between the 
monadological system and Spinozism.
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NOTE ON TRANSLATIONS AND REFERENCES
Where English translations are available, I have quoted from them, sometimes with 
modifications. References to Leibniz’s works are keyed to the list of abbreviations 
which follows.
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ABBREVIATION
AG G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Essays. Trans, and edited by Roger Ariew and
Daniel Garber. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989.
G Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Hrsg. von C. I.
Gerhardt, 7 Bde., Berlin 1875-90.
H G. W. Leibniz: Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness o f God, the Freedom o f Man
and the Origin o f Evil Edited by Austin Farrer. Trans, by E. M. Huggard. La 
Salle: Open Court, 1985.
L Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters. 2nd ed. Trans,
and edited by Leroy E. Loemker. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969.
M Leibniz: Discourse on Metaphysics, Correspondence with Amauld, and
Monadology. Trans, by George R. Montgomery. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 
1902
WF Leibniz’s ‘New System’ and Associated Contemporary Texts. Trans, and ed. by
R. S. Woolhouse and Richard Francks. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.
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INTRODUCTION
There was an opinion prevailing in 19th-century Germany among historians of 
philosophy, according to which the monadological system ends in Spinozism.1 This 
opinion was so deep-rooted that even in Leibniz’s lifetime there existed a suspicion that 
his theory of monads has an affinity with Spinozism. Wolff was obliged to struggle 
against the accusation that Leibniz was a plagiarist of Spinoza. The well-known 
controversy between Jacobi and Mendelssohn, which broke out over Lessing’s 
Spinozism, was somewhat concerned with the relation between the two philosophers. 
Of the German idealists, who were deeply influenced by this controversy, Schelling 
went so far as to identify ‘monads’ with ‘modes,’ assuming it as admitted that 
‘Leibniz’s monads are not a decisive measure against Spinozism.’3 The said opinion is 
in line with this long-established tradition.4
Meanwhile, in the late nineteenth century, Ludwig Stein published a book entitled 
Leibniz und Spinoza. This book treats of the development of Leibniz’s philosophy in 
connexion with Spinoza, and in part in connexion with Plato, who provided Leibniz 
with ‘weapons’5 against Spinozism. And what Stein presented there, though not entirely
1 See e.g., Erdmann, Versuch einer wissenschciftlichen Darstellung der Geschichte der neuem  
Philosophie, Band IV, Zeller, Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie seit Leibniz and Fischer, 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Leben, Werke und Lehre.
See Schelling, Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature o f Human Freedom, pp. 16-7. When he 
describes the history of philosophy, however, he makes a distinction between the philosophy of 
Leibniz and that of Spinoza; see, for example, On the History o f Modern Philosophy, pp. 64 ff.
3 Ibid., p. 17.
4 For further details, see Stein, Leibniz und Spinoza, Kapitel I.
5 Ibid., S. XI; see also S. 134 ff.
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accurate, appeared to bring the matter to an issue at that time. For instance in the essay 
‘On the Relation between the Philosophy of Spinoza and That of Leibniz,’ published in 
1899, Robert Latta says: ‘[Stein’s Leibniz, und Spinoza] seems to me to prove 
conclusively that Leibniz was no more a plagiarist of Spinoza than he was a plagiarist of 
Newton, but that he was “philosophically homo sui g e n e r i s strongly influenced by 
thinkers like Plato and Spinoza, yet in his philosophy neither Platonist nor Spinozist but 
always Leibnizian.’6 It is indeed true that this book of Stein’s threw great light upon the 
relation between Leibniz and Spinoza, which had long remained obscure; but as to the 
difference between the two systems, he avoided forming a definite conclusion. Instead, 
he closely scrutinised the Refutation inedite de Spinoza par Leibniz, which was 
published in 1854 by Alexandre Foucher de Careil, and showed that it in fact contains 
no ‘“refutation” of Spinoza,’7 but an ‘examination of his basic teachings from the 
standpoint of the theory of monads,’8 whose results, however, are not satisfactory. 
‘Nevertheless,’ Stein adds, ‘until the end of his life Leibniz had an unshakable 
conviction that his theory of monads completely overcame [Spinozistic] pantheism.’9 
Stein, however, gives us no explanation for the basis of this conviction.
At the turn of the century, in his Critical Exposition o f  the Philosophy o f Leibniz 
Bertrand Russell, mentioning the relation between the two systems, concluded that 
‘Leibniz, whenever he treats God at all seriously, falls involuntarily into a Spinozistic
6 Latta, ‘On the Relation between the Philosophy of Spinoza and That of Leibniz,’ p. 333.
7 Stein, Leibniz und Spinoza, S. 237. According to Stein, Foucher de Careil, being overzealous to 
purify Leibniz of all Spinozism, somewhat exaggeratedly so entitled; see ibid., S. 224 ff.
8 Ibid., S. 238.
9 Ibid., S. XIV; see also S. 250 ff.
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pantheism.’10 Since then, it seems to me, the relation between the philosophy of 
Leibniz and that of Spinoza has become a minor subject which is discussed only 
occasionally.11
I have made these historical remarks in the first place because it seems to me that 
the monadological system differs essentially from Spinozism and that this difference 
becomes distinct especially when the relation between God and creatures is spoken of. 
When, for instance, Leibniz explains the difference between his system and Spinozism, 
he insists upon the plurality of monads; for, according to him, Spinoza in contrast 
conceives of God as the only substance and of creatures as its modifications or 
accidents. Writing to Bourguet, who doubted that there is an affinity between the theory 
of monads and Spinozism, Leibniz says with some irritation: ‘I do not see how you can 
deduce any Spinozism from this; to do so is to jump at conclusions. On the contrary, it 
is though these very monads that Spinozism is destroyed, for there are just as many true 
substances, as many living mirrors of the universe which subsist always, or as many 
concentrated universes, as there are monads; according to Spinoza, on the contrary, 
there is only one substance. He would be right if there were no monads; then everything 
except God would be of a passing nature and would vanish into simple accidents or 
modifications, since there would be no substantial foundation in things, such as consists
10 Russell, The Philosophy o f Leibniz, pp. 185-6.
11 For example, Hicks, ‘The “Modes” of Spinoza and the “Monads” of Leibniz,’ Friedmann, Leibniz 
et Spinoza, Parkinson, ‘Leibniz’s Paris Writings in Relation to Spinoza’ and Adams, Leibniz: 
Determinist, Theist, Idealist, Chapter 4, section 3. This is partly because, I think, after the 
publication of Russell’s Critical Exposition o f the Philosophy o f Leibniz (1900) and Louis Couturat’s 
La Logique de Leibniz (1901), their interpretation— which regards Leibniz’s philosophy as being 
‘almost entirely derived from his logic’ (Russell, The Philosophy o f Leibniz, p. IX)— became 
predominant.
in the existence of monads’ (G III 575/L 663).
These words, to be sure, sound^ too simple and naive to ‘destroy’ Spinozism. But, 
Leibniz himself never thought so. In a sense, therefore, the main task of the present 
thesis is to understand the real meaning of the above statement, that is to say, to clarify 
the relation between God and creatures in the monadological system, in contrast with 
Spinozism.
But before performing this task, I should like to show, to a considerable extent, the 
uniqueness of the Leibnizian conception of the relation between God and creatures, 
without, however, reference to Spinozism. In the monadological system, as we shall see, 
the relation between God and creatures corresponds to the relation between the soul and 
the body. And these two relations are both ontological—by which I mean that they are 
essentially concerned with the distinction between a being and its being. Therefore, in 
order to explicate these two relations properly, I shall make recourse to what Heidegger 
calls the ‘ontological difference’— by which beings are rigorously differentiated from 
their being. In other words, I shall adopt the Heideggerian ontology as a method of the 
interpretation of Leibniz. This may perhaps surprise the reader. So I wish here to inform 
the reader in advance that whenever I introduce a Heideggerian concept to my argument, 
I shall endeavour not only to explain this concept as clearly as possible, but also to 
make it clear why I need to apply such a concept to Leibniz’s philosophy. Thus, I 
believe, the reader—even if unfamiliar with Heidegger’s philosophy— will have no 
great difficulty in understanding the main argument. (Sometimes I shall enter somewhat 
minutely into Heidegger’s philosophy in footnotes; but they are not essential for the 
understanding of the main argument.)
The present thesis will be divided into three parts.
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Part One is a preliminary study for the following two parts. I shall begin by 
considering what kind of being God and creatures are in the monadological system: God 
will be characterised as a spirit destitute of body, and creatures as corporeal substances. 
As the status of coiporeal substances in Leibniz’s philosophy is highly controversial, I 
shall have an opportunity of entering into recent discussions on it. But the chief aim in 
this part is to show the correspondence between the relation of the soul to its body and 
the relation of God to his creatures (or the world as the sum of all created beings). 
Therefore I shall speak mainly of the relation between the soul and the body, between 
simple and corporeal substances. This relation, as I have already mentioned, will be 
determined ontologically, that is to say, with recourse to Heidegger’s ontological 
difference. Moreover, the thesis which Leibniz often advances in his later writings, 
namely that ‘a body is an aggregate of monads,’ will be interpreted ontologically. I shall 
also try to explain, on the basis of these considerations, how Aristotelianism and 
Platonism coexist in Leibniz’s philosophy.
Part Two is the main part of the present thesis. It is intended, in this part, to show 
more clearly how the relation of the soul to its body corresponds to the relation of God 
to the world. I shall first of all try to determine in more detail the relation between the 
soul and the body, by grasping it as the relation among the dominant monad, its body 
and the subordinate monads. This latter relation will be divided into two relations: the 
relation of the dominant monad to the subordinate monads and the relation of the 
subordinate monads to the body of the dominant monad. And in order to explicate these 
two relations properly, I shall again have recourse to Heidegger’s ontological difference.
7
But in this part it will also be divided into two kinds; one will be applied to the relation 
between the dominant monad and the subordinate monads, and another to the relation
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between the subordinate monads and the body of the dominant monad. These two kinds 
of ontological difference, however, are rather difficult to understand, and require a 
further explanation. Since Heidegger himself acquired them from his unique 
interpretation of Plato’s theory of ideas, I shall survey it at some length in order to 
support the above explanation. Through this survey it will be shown that there is a 
structural resemblance between Plato’s theory of ideas and Leibniz’s theory of monads. 
(But, in the present thesis, I shall avoid treating directly of the relation between Leibniz 
and Plato, though it is an interesting topic.)12 After explicating, by the two kinds of 
ontological difference, the relation of the dominant monad to the subordinate monads 
and the relation of the subordinate monads to the body of the dominant monad, I shall 
further try to show that God is the most dominant monad; that all created monads, on 
the other hand, are subordinate to him, making up a part of the world; but that each one 
of them, as a dominant monad, does the same thing as God, imitating him in a greater or 
less degree. The essential difference between God and creatures in the monadological 
system will also be shown. Finally, the correspondence between the soul-body relation 
and the God-world relation will be clarified.
Part Three is a supplement to Part Two. For, in this part, I shall treat of a paradox 
which follows from the correspondence of the relation between the soul and the body 
with the relation between God and the world. That is to say, if God is to the world as the 
soul is to its body, it follows that he is the world-soul which has the world as its body. 
But Leibniz consistently rejected such a conception of God, ascribing it particularly to 
Spinoza. I shall then examine the reason for this rejection and criticise the opinion of
12 On the relation between Leibniz and Plato, see for example Stein, Leibniz und Spinoza, Kapitel
VI and Mercer, Leibniz’s Metaphysics: Its Origins and Development, Parts Three and Four.
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Kuno Fischer, according to which the conception of God as the highest monad leads to 
the doctrine of the world-soul: with the aim of showing that this doctrine itself does not 
contradict the theory of monads. This aim will be achieved by reconsidering what has 
been said of the relation among the dominant monad, its body and the subordinate 
monads. It is in this part that the contrast is made between the monadological system 
and Spinozism.
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PART ONE
Before treating of the relation between God and creatures in the monadological 
system, I should like to make clear what kind of being God and creatures are.
Leibniz characterises God in various ways; for example, he speaks of God in the 
Discourse on Metaphysics as ‘an absolutely perfect being’ (G IV 427/L 303), ‘the sun 
and the light of souls’ (G IV 453/L 321), ‘the greatest of all beings’ (G IV 460/L 326), 
‘the most perfect of all spirits’ (G IV 460/L 326), and ‘the monarch of the most perfect 
Republic consisting of all spirits’ (G II 14/L 326); in the essay On the Radical 
Origination o f Things as ‘the ultimate reason for things’ (G VII 302/L 486); in 
Considerations on Vital Principles and Plastic Natures as being ‘above all matter’ (G 
VI 546/L 590); in the Monadology as ‘the primary unity or the simple original substance 
of which all the created or derivative monads are products’ (G VI 6 14/L 647); and in the 
Correspondence with Clarke as ‘intelligentia supramundana (G VII 358 ff./L 679 ff.). 
But I have no intention of treating of all these features here; instead, I wish to take up 
only this feature, that God is ‘above all matter’; that is to say, that he has no body. ‘God 
alone,’ says Leibniz, ‘is entirely detached from body’ (G VI 619/L 650). Although God 
is a spirit, since he is without body, he has no limitations; therefore he is called ‘actus 
purus’ (G II 325).
On the other hand, creatures must have a body; in other words, being extended, they 
are always corporeal substances. Each of these substances, like men or animals, is 
composed of an organic body and the soul which is its entelechy. According to Leibniz, 
no entelechy can ‘ever lack an organic body’ (G II 251/L 530; cf. G II 324 ff.; G VI 
545-6/L 590; G VII 330). ‘Together with a particular body,’ he says, ‘each monad makes
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a living substance’ (G VI 599/L 637). By the way, there are in an organic body an 
infinity of simple substances which are the souls of the organs or cells of this body; and 
these simple substances are dominated by one simple substance, the soul of this entire 
body. Under such domination a body which is itself divisible into smaller bodies ad 
infinitum is substantially unified by its soul; it is thus that a living organism results from 
simple substances or monads. In the preliminary study for his letter to Des Bosses of 5 
February 1712, Leibniz writes that ‘monads,’ being ‘under the domination of one 
monad,’ ‘make up one organic body, that is, one machine of nature’ (G II 439/AG 199).
‘And in this,’ he continues, ‘consists the metaphysical bond between the soul and the 
body, which constitute a unum suppositum . . . .  And these are those which make up a 
unum per se, that is, a unum suppositum ’ (G II 439/AG 199). From this it is clear that 
Leibniz regards a corporeal substance composed of soul and organic body as a unum per  
se or a unum suppositum.1 Since, according to him, ‘Ens and unum are convertible
1 In the Correspondence with De Bosses (1706-16) Leibniz seems to think that the union between
the soul and the body cannot be sufficiently explained only by the pre-established harmony.
Therefore he admits ‘some real metaphysical union between the soul and the organic body’ (G II
371/L 598), which makes them a unum per se or a unum suppositum. This admission had already 
been made by him to Toumemine, who maintains that the pre-established harmony does not account
for the ‘union’ between the soul and the body, but only for their ‘correspondence’ (cf. WF 246 ff.; G
VI 45/H 68-9; see also Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, Chapter 10, section 5 and 
Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order o f Nature, Chapter 10). And now Leibniz, in order to 
explain the unity of a corporeal substance, develops the concept of a ‘substantial bond [vinculum 
substantiate]’ (cf. G II 435 ff./L 600 ff.); the substantial bond is a ‘real unifier’ (G II 435/L 600) 
which unifies a collection of monads and makes them be a single living creature. ‘Monads,’ he says,
‘do not constitute a complete composite substance, since they do not make up a unum per se but 
merely an aggregate, unless some substantial bond is added’ (G II 444/L 602). Therefore it seems to 
me that the substantial bond is in essence nothing else than the domination of a dominant monad /  
over the monads subordinate to it. (More will be said of this in Part Two.) In any case, the doctrine , 
of the substantial bond has long since perplexed commentators; for it results in admitting a
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terms’ (G II 304/R 248; cf. G II 97/M 191), and ‘what is not truly a being is not truly a 
being’ (G II 97/M 191), we can say that a corporeal substance is truly a being. Moreover, 
as corporeal substances are in some sense ‘assemblages’ of simple substances (L 636), 
they are called also ‘compound’ substances; and regarding them Leibniz repeats (in the 
same study which I have just quoted): ‘Composite substances are those which constitute 
a unum per se, composed of a soul and an organic body, which is a machine of nature 
resulting from monads’ (G II 439/AG 199). Undoubtedly he thinks here that corporeal 
substances are a unum per se and a basic unit of nature.
The same idea is expressed in the Discourse on Metaphysics (1686) and the 
Correspondence with Arnauld (1686-90), where Leibniz laid the foundations of his 
mature philosophy. For instance, after confirming in section 12 of the Discourse that
metaphysical union between the soul and the body, other than the union which is given to them by 
the pre-established harmony. (For further details, see Russell, The Philosophy o f Leibniz, pp. 147 ff., 
Rescher, The Philosophy o f Leibniz, pp. 121 f f ,  Broad, Leibniz: An Introduction, pp. 124 f f , Adams, 
Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, pp. 299 ff. and Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order o f 
Nature, pp. 276 ff.) By the way, as we shall see shortly, in the Discourse on Metaphysics (1686) and 
the Correspondence with Arnauld (1686-90) Leibniz conceives of a substantial form as giving a 
substantial unity to matter; hence it has the same character as the substantial bond. (In fact in a letter 
to Des Bosses of August 1715 he identifies the substantial bond with ‘what the Scholastics call a 
substantial form’ (G II 504/L 614).) Whence the same problem as above mentioned arises. But in this 
period he seems not to care much about it. For he speaks of the soul as a substantial form by reason 
that it unifies its body substantially, while at the same time he says: ‘The soul is . . . the form of its 
body, because it expresses the phenomena of all other bodies according to their relation to its own’ 
(G II 58/M 135). (Cf. Brown, Leibniz, pp. 165 ff., Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, pp. 
291 ff. and Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order o f Nature, pp. 266 ff.) In what follows, 
however, I shall scarcely speak of the union between the soul and the body which is given by the 
harmony of perceptions; for I believe that there must be a real metaphysical union between the soul 
and the body which is not explicable only by this harmony. This union, however, does not compete 
with the pre-established harmony, but complements it. (Cf. Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, 
Idealist, pp. 294.)
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‘anyone who will meditate about the nature of substance . . . will find2 that the entire 
body does not consist merely in extension . . . , but that there must necessarily be 
recognized in it something related to souls, which is commonly called a substantial 
form . . (G IV 436/L 309), he makes in section 34 an assumption that ‘the bodies 
which make up a unum per se, for example man, are substances . . . and . . . have 
substantial forms’ (G IV 459/L 325). Since, as I have already remarked, matter can be 
divided into smaller parts ad infinitum, it cannot by itself constitute a single being; in 
order to do so, it requires a soul or a substantial form which unifies these parts and 
makes them one. If, therefore, a body lacks a soul or a substantial form, it remains a 
‘unum per accidens,’ a ‘being by aggregation,’ ‘plura entia ’— in a word, a 
‘phenomenon.’ Accordingly, he writes to Arnauld: ‘ . . . the matter which is understood 
as the mass in itself is only a pure phenomenon or appearance, as well-founded, 
however, as is space and time. It has not even those precise and determined qualities 
which can enable it to pass as a determined being . . . , because figure itself, which is the 
essence of a limited extended mass, is never, strictly speaking, perfectly determined in 
the state of nature because of the actually infinite division of the parts of matter . . . .  
Consequently extended mass, when considered without entelechies . . . , is not a 
corporeal substance but a wholly pure phenomenon like the rainbow. It has been also
2 The first draft has in addition these words: ‘that bodies are not substances in strict metaphysics 
(this was indeed the opinion of the Platonists), and . . . ’ (L 328). ‘Bodies’ here do not mean corporeal 
substances composed of the soul and the body, but bodies by themselves, putting aside their souls (cf. 
G II 75/M 159). This is indeed in accord with Plato’s opinion; for, according to Leibniz, Plato is the 
one who ‘showed very clearly that matter alone does not suffice for forming a substance’ (G II 76/M  
161); in the essay On Nature Itself ( 1698) Leibniz repeats: ‘Surely if corporeal things contained 
nothing but matter, they could most truly be said to consist of a flux and to have nothing substantial, 
as the Platonists long ago recognized’ (G IV 509/L 502).
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recognized by philosophers that it is the substantial form which gives a definite being to 
matter . . (G II 118-9/M 222). It is to be observed here that Leibniz acknowledges the 
substantial form to be that ‘which gives a definite being to matter.’ As I shall argue 
presently, if a soul is thought to be that which gives a being to its body, or that which 
endows its body with a unity, it can itself be neither a being nor a unity in the strict 
metaphysical sense; for it is rather that which makes its body be, or that which unifies 
its body. And what is to be called a ‘being’ or a ‘unity’ in such a case is what is given a 
being, or what is endowed with a unity— that is to say, a corporeal substance, such as a 
man or an animal. Therefore, Leibniz says: ‘. . . man . . .  is a being endowed with a 
real unity; his soul gives him this unity although the mass of his body is divided into 
organs, ducts, humors, spirits, and that the parts are doubtless full of an infinity of other 
corporeal substances endowed with their own entelechies’ (G II 120/M 224).
I thence form a judgment that corporeal substances are basic beings in the 
monadological system; in other words, that every being in the monadological system is 
a corporeal substance composed of soul and body. To this, however, many will object: 
for it has been widely accepted since the publication of C. D. Broad’s lectures on 
Leibniz4 that although in the Discourse and the Correspondence with Arnauld Leibniz 
certainly conceived of corporeal substances as being no less real than simple substances 
and as constituting a unum per se, a genuine being, he changed his mind afterwards and
It is, nevertheless, possible to call simple substances ‘beings’ or ‘unities,’ although in a special 
sense; as for instance when Leibniz says that simple substances are ‘absolutely real’ (G II 119/M 
223). In this case corporeal substances are regarded as ‘phenomena.’ But we cannot simply identify 
these phenomena with what is not real, until we understand in what sense simple substances can be 
called ‘beings.’ See the following argument.
4 Broad, Leibniz: An Introduction.
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came to conceive only of simple substances (or monads) as existing in reality, and o f all 
the rest resulting from them as beings by aggregation, that is to say, ‘phenomena.’ 
According to Broad, this change occurred in the Correspondence with De Voider 
(1699-1706).5 In fact Leibniz writes to De Voider in June 1703: ‘. . . only simple things 
are true things, and the rest are beings by aggregation and therefore phenomena, 
existing, as Democritus put it, by convention but not by nature [nomo not physei]
(G II 252/L 531); in January 1704: ‘Therefore I feel that the bodies that are popularly 
regarded as substances are nothing but real phenomena, and are no more substances 
than parhelia and rainbows are’6 (G II 262); and in June 1704: ‘. . . there is nothing in 
the world except simple substances and, in them, perception and appetite’ (G II 270/L 
537). These words are seemingly out of accord with the passages quoted above from his 
earlier writings. Therefore it is said that in his philosophical career Leibniz had two 
different views on corporeal substances. The one may be characterised as ‘Aristotelian’ 
and the other as ‘idealistic’ or ‘Platonic’; for in the Discourse and the Correspondence 
with Arnauld he adopted the substantial forms of the Peripatetic Schoolmen, holding 
that the soul and the body are inseparably united in one substance, but after the 
Correspondence with De Voider he sharply distinguished monads from bodies, and
5 Ibid., p. 88 ff. If this view of Broad’s is right, the theory of the substantial bond, which Leibniz 
advanced in the Correspondence with Des Bosses (1706-16), will be regarded as an inauthentic part 
of his later philosophy; and perhaps one may say with Russell, that Leibniz developed this theory in 
order to ‘reconcile his philosophy with the dogma of transubstantiation,’ (Russell, The Philosophy o f  
Leibniz, p. 151), and that he himself never believed it. Hence, one may continue, the substantial bond 
is ‘rather the concession of a diplomatist than the creed of a philosopher {ibid., p. 152). Broad’s 
evaluation of the theory of the substantial bond seems quite similar to Russell’s (see Broad, Leibniz: 
An Introduction, pp. 124 ff.).
6 Translated and quoted by Robert Merrihew Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, p. 218.
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conceived of the latter as reducible to the former,7 or, it may be said in Plato’s language, 
of the former as ontos on, what really is, and of the latter as me on, what really is not. 
Many regard these two views as inconsistent, while, on the other hand, Daniel Garber 
regards them as ‘two different ways of working out what is, at root, a single position.’8 
I favour this opinion of Garber’s. It is true that Leibniz’s philosophy has both 
Aristotelian and Platonic features, but it seems to me that they are, as we shall see, 
harmonised in a particular way. This is why, for instance, Leibniz never felt it
7 Strictly speaking, it has been recognised that there are two models of reduction in the later Leibniz. 
The one is called the ‘aggregate thesis’ by Nicholas Jolley ( ‘Leibniz and Phenomenalism,’ p. 154); 
for bodies, on this model, are to be reduced to ‘aggregates of monads’; in other words, ‘a particular 
aggregate of monads appears to human observers as an extended physical object’ (ibid., p. 155). The 
other model, it is said, is ‘phenomenalistic’; for bodies, on this model, are reducible to ‘sets of 
harmonised perceptions,’ as for instance when Leibniz says: ‘Matter and motion . . .  are not so much 
substances or things as they are the phenomena of percipient beings, whose reality is located in the 
harmony of the percipient with himself (at different times) and with other percipient beings’ (G II 
270/L 537). Many regard these two models as incompatible; hence some think that Leibniz only 
flirted with phenomenalism; some, however, think that Leibniz was at first committed to the 
aggregate thesis, but that he afterwards came to embrace a phenomenalistic opinion in regard to the 
nature of bodies. (See for example Montgomery Furth, ‘Monadology,’ pp. 14 ff., Louis E. Loeb, 
From Descartes to Hume, pp. 301 ff. and Catherine Wilson, Leibniz’s Metaphysics, pp. 190 ff.) On 
the other hand, some argue that these two models are reconcilable. (See for example Robert 
Merrihew Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, Chapters 9 and 10.) I shall have occasion 
very soon to make some remarks on Leibniz’s ‘phenomenalism.’ In regard to the aggregate thesis, I 
shall argue it from an ontological point of view.
8 Garber, ‘Leibniz and the Foundations of Physics: The Middle Years,’ p. 65. However, Garber 
acknowledges also that Leibniz’s idealism differs significantly from his Aristotelianism (see ibid., pp. 
62 ff.). For instance, in his later years Leibniz came to shift the emphasis from corporeal to 
incorporeal substances, that is to say, to monads. (I shall later try to explain why he did so.) Adams 
also thinks that ‘the Aristotelian elements that are undeniably present in Leibniz’s thought are not 
inconsistent with his monadological theories’ (Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, p. 308); but 
unlike Garber he regards the former as a ‘part’ (ibid., p. 308) of the latter, holding that Leibniz was 
an idealist throughout his career. See ibid., Part III.
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contradictory to speak at once of the Peripatetic doctrine of substantial forms and of 
Plato’s doctrine of matter.— In any case, as long as Leibniz speaks of bodies as 
‘phenomena,’ it will be asked, how can we hold that corporeal substances are ‘basic 
beings’?
To this I will reply in the first place: if monads alone are beings, then corporeal 
substances resulting from them become something less than beings— namely, 
‘phenomena’ as Leibniz himself says. But if corporeal substances, in virtue of monads, /I
can be called ‘beings’ or at least regarded as a ‘kind of being,’ we can no longer call 
these monads ‘beings’; for in this case these monads are not beings, but rather 
something more than beings— what makes beings be, the being o f corporeal 
substances.9
Secondly, I find it important to make a distinction between beings by aggregation 
which have a true unity and beings by aggregation which lack a true unity. (It seems to 
me that Leibniz retained this distinction throughout the last thirty years of his life.)
The former are those beings whose reality derives intrinsically from their 
souls—namely, corporeal substances: e.g., a man or an animal. This kind of being is a 
being by aggregation in the sense that it is composed of organs and cells; but these 
organs and cells, as we have seen, are substantially unified by a dominant entelechy. 
Therefore Leibniz writes to De Voider in June 1703: ‘When I say that even if it is 
corporeal, a substance contains an infinity of machines, I think it must be added at the 
same time that it forms one machine composed of these machines and that it is actuated, 
besides, by one entelechy, without which it would contain no principle of true unity’ (G
9 Here it is necessary to distinguish beings from their being. I shall have a further opportunity to 
make this clear hereafter.
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II 250/L 529).
The latter, on the other hand, are those beings whose unity is given by the mind of 
the percipient and which have only an ‘accidental’ or ‘arbitrary’ (G II 250/L 529) unity; 
or those beings whose reality derives from their component elements endowed with a 
true unity and which have only a ‘borrowed’ (G II 261, 267/R 249, 242 ) reality: e.g., an 
army of men or a herd of animals. In the Correspondence with Arnauld, Leibniz speaks 
of this kind of being as depending upon ‘the fiction of our minds’ (G II 76/M 161; cf. G 
II 102/M 198) and as ‘a being of the imagination or perception, that is to say, a 
phenomenon (G II 96/M 190)’; and what constitutes its essence ‘consists solely in the 
mode of the being of its component elements’ (G II 97/M 190). But this does not mean 
that beings by aggregation which lack a true unity are ‘wholly imaginary’ (G II 97/M 
191) and have no reality nor substantiality at all: ‘I do not say that there is nothing 
substantial or nothing but appearance in things which have not a true unity, for I 
acknowledge that they have as much of reality or substantiality as there is of true unity 
in that which enters into their composition’ (G II 97/M 191; cf. G II 96/M 189-90). In 
my judgement, Leibniz says nothing more than this in the Correspondence with De 
Voider: ‘Whatever things are aggregates of many, are not one except for the mind, nor 
have any other reality than what is borrowed, or what belongs to the things of which 
they are compounded’ (21 January 1704) (G II 261/R 249); and again: ‘A thing which 
can be divided into several (already actually existing) is an aggregate of several, and . . . 
is not one except mentally, and has no reality but what is borrowed from its constituents’ 
(30 June 1704) (G II 267/R 242). Furthermore, in order to describe the manner of the 
being of these latter beings, he refers to Democritus both in the Correspondence with 
Arnauld and in the Correspondence with De Voider; in a letter to Arnauld he writes:
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‘We may say of these compounds and of similar things what Democritus said very well 
of them, namely esse opinione, lege, nom o’ (G II 101/M 196-7); correspondingly, in a 
letter to De Voider he speaks, as we have seen, of beings by aggregation (which, it is 
evident, lack a true unity) as ‘existing . . .  by convention but not by nature [nomo not 
physeiY (G II 252/L531).
By the way, the rainbow, which Leibniz often takes as an example of phenomena, is 
of the kind of the latter beings— if drops of water, of which it is composed, can be 
compared to a ‘pond full of fish’ (G IV 482/L 456; G VI 618/L 650); in this case, the 
reality of the rainbow comes from microorganisms living within the drops of water. A 
mere mass of matter which lacks a soul10 must be of this kind; for it is, as Leibniz 
himself writes to De Voider in June 1704, ‘nothing but a phenomenon grounded in 
things, like the rainbow or the mock-sun, and all reality belongs only to unities’ (G II 
268/L 536). Therefore, when Leibniz says that ‘bodies that are popularly regarded as 
substances are nothing but real phenomena, and are no more substances than parhelia 
and rainbows are,’ we should think that by ‘bodies’ he means those bodies which lack a 
soul. By contrast, when he says in the draft of the letter of Nov. 28-Dec. 8 to Arnauld 
that ‘bodies are substances and not merely true phenomena like the rainbow,’ we should 
think that by ‘bodies’ he means bodies which have a soul, namely beings by aggregation 
which have a true unity. And if by the expression ‘phenomenon’ is meant that which 
really is not, but which seems to be— that is to say, ‘semblance,’ it is to be used only to 
describe bodies which lack a soul, namely beings by aggregation which lack a true
10 i.e., secondary matter, which ‘exists like a herd or a family, that is to say, like an ens per  
aggregation ’ (G II 304).
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unity.11
In fact in the tabulation which appears in the supplement to his letter to Des Boss of 
19 August 1715, Leibniz treats of such a being as an animal as being classified as a 
‘unum per se ’ and a ‘full being’; but on the other hand, he treats of such a being as an
11 Thus I think that those who maintain that in his later years Leibniz became a phenomenalist have 
made a double mistake. Firstly, they do not distinguish beings by aggregation which have a true 
unity from beings by aggregation which lack a true unity, treating every kind of being by 
aggregation as having no true unity; and, secondly, since they do not admit beings by aggregation 
which have a true unity, they conceive of beings by aggregation which have no true unity— although 
these beings, as we have seen, are not ‘wholly imaginary’ in virtue of their component elements, 
each of which is a being by aggregation which has a true unity— as ‘purely mental’; as a result, they 
are obliged to abandon even the distinction between ‘real’ phenomena such as the rainbow and 
‘imaginary’ phenomena such as an orderly dream. But it is this idea that Leibniz rejects in a letter to 
Amauld, by saying: ‘You object, M., that it might be of the essence of bodies to have no true unity. 
But it will be then the essence of bodies to be phenomena deprived of all reality as would be an 
orderly dream, for phenomena, like the rainbow or like a pile of stones, will be wholly imaginary if 
they are not composed of beings which have a true unity’ (G II 97/M 191-2). (It is true that a being 
by aggregation which lacks a true unity, as Leibniz writes to Amauld, is ‘a being of the imagination 
or perception, that is to say, a phenomenon’ (G II 96/M 190); in the Conversation o f  Philarete and 
Ariste (1711) he repeats that a being by aggregation which lacks a true unity is ‘a being of reason or 
rather, of imagination, a phenomenon’ (G VI 586/L 623). But this does not mean that a being by 
aggregation which lacks a true unity is an ‘imaginary’ phenomenon; as I have already observed, it is 
a ‘real’ phenomenon.) But it may still be asked, why Leibniz sometimes speaks as if he was a 
phenomenalist? As far as I can judge, by the thesis that bodies are reducible to sets of perceptions, he 
means that in representing the soul ‘discovers’ all physical objects ‘in their being’ (Heidegger, Being 
and Time, p. 12); as for instance, when Aristotle says that ‘the soul is in a way all existing things’ 
(Aristotle, De Anima, Book III, 8. 431b 21; see also Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 12); in other 
words, the above thesis is an ontological one. And on the basis of this ontological thesis, a 
distinction between ‘real’ and ‘imaginary’ phenomena and a distinction between beings by 
aggregation which have a true unity and beings by aggregation which lack a tme unity should be 
made; nonetheless, those who hold that Leibniz is a phenomenalist seem to arrive at the above thesis 
by discarding these two distinctions. I therefore think that their opinion is right, but only on the 
surface.
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army of men or a herd of animals as a ‘semisubstance,’ and as being classified as a 
‘unum per aggregationem,’ a ‘semibeing,’ and, what is most important, a ‘phenomenon’ 
(G II 506/L 617). Therefore, strictly speaking, only beings by aggregation which lack a 
true unity should be called ‘phenomena.’ In other words, corporeal substances 
composed of soul and body are something more than phenomena;12 and if this be so, 
they cannot but be that which is— namely, beings. And if they are beings, simple 
substances, as I have already remarked, should not be grasped as beings, but rather as 
the being o f beings.
In order, therefore, to understand the relation between simple and corporeal 
substances properly, I think it good to consult what Heidegger13 calls the ‘ontological 
difference.’ The ontological difference is the distinction ‘between being and beings,’ and 
‘not between one being and another being.’ 14 According to Heidegger, being is 
‘essentially different from a being, from beings,’ although it is ‘always the being of a
12 But this does not mean that corporeal substances are ‘well-founded’ phenomena; for 
‘well-founded’ phenomena, like ‘pure’ or ‘real’ or ‘true’ phenomena such as rainbows, means 
nothing else than beings by aggregation which lack a true unity. If, nevertheless, one still calls 
corporeal substances ‘phenomena,’ this expression ‘phenomena’ must be understood to signify 
‘beings in general’; as for instance, when Leibniz says that since the consideration of substantial 
forms ‘serves no purpose in the details of physics . . . . they ought not to be used to explain
particular phenomena’ (G IV 434/L 308). (The Greek expression ‘phainomena, ’ from which the term 
‘phenomena’ derives, can also mean both ‘ta onta’ (beings) and ‘semblance.’ See Heidegger, Being 
and Time, pp. 25 ff. and Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 104 ff.) But in this case the distinction 
between beings by aggregation which have a true unity and beings by aggregation which lack a true 
unity will disappear.
13 I am greatly indebted to Heidegger for interpreting monads as the being of beings. According to 
him, ‘[t]he monadology tries to clarify the being of beings’ (Heidegger, The Metaphysical 
Foundations o f Logic, p. 85). For his own interpretation of Leibniz, see for example ibid., First 
Major Part, Nietzsche, Band II, S. 397 ff. and The Principle o f Reason.
14 Heidegger, The Basic Problems o f Phenomenology, p. 17.
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being’;15 for, he says, ‘[t]he being of beings “is” itself not a being.’16 Thus ‘the first 
philosophical step in understanding the problem of being consists in . . . not determining 
beings as beings by tracing them back in their origins to another being— as if being had 
the character of a possible being.’17
Nevertheless, being is often spoken of as if it were a being. And the same can be 
said of the monad; for it is on the one hand such a being as a unity, but on the other hand 
it is that which unifies what is not a unity in itself and which makes it be as a unity— in 
a word, a unifier. That is to say, just as the word ‘being’ can signify both ‘a being’ and 
‘the being of a being,’ so the monad can be both a being and what makes a being be, the 
being of a being. This is why Leibniz speaks of monads sometimes as ‘unities,’ and 
sometimes as 'the p r in c ip le s  o f  a true unity ’ (G IV 478/L 454). Since for him, as I have 
already touched upon, ‘one and being are reciprocal terms’ (G II 97/M 191), monads
can be both ‘beings’ and ‘the principles of a true being.’ It is because of this ambiguity
18that he sometimes identifies monads with corporeal substances. To be sure, the monad, 
taken by itself apart from its body, is what makes this body be as a being, but in so far as 
it always has a body, it cannot but be as a corporeal substance; therefore it is quite 
possible to speak of a monad as if it was a corporeal substance. But in order to avoid 
confusion it would be better to treat of corporeal substances composed of soul and body 
as b a sic  beings, and of simple substances as the b e in g  o f  th ese  beings.
And if the relation between simple and corporeal substances is ontological in the 
sense that I have just explained, the thesis which Leibniz often advances in his later
15 Ibid. p. 17.
16 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 5.
17 Ibid., p. 5.
18 Cf. Broad, Leibniz: An Introduction, pp. 88 ff. and Wilson, Leibniz’s Metaphysics, pp. 190 ff.
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writings, namely that ‘a body is an aggregate of monads,’ is also to be interpreted 
ontologically. This thesis, however, has been traditionally understood to mean that a 
collection of monads appears as a body when it is ‘misperceived’ by other monads.19
(Following Donald Rutherford, we may call this interpretation the ‘misperception
20interpretation.’ ) That is to say, bodies are nothing else than the products of confused 
perceptions; and if this be the case, all bodies, whether organic or inorganic, become 
illusions or well-founded phenomena. But as far as I can judge, this can be said only of 
beings by aggregation which lack a true unity, such as an army of men or a herd of 
animals, the rainbow or the parhelion, and a mere mass of matter which lacks a soul; for, 
as we have seen, this kind of being is given a unity by the mind of the percipient, is 
made to be by this mind, and exists only for this mind— although it is not ‘wholly 
imaginary,’ but only ‘semimental’ (G II 304, 306), obtaining its reality from its 
component elements endowed with a true unity. (Thus, strictly speaking, this kind of 
being is not an aggregate of monads, but rather an aggregate of corporeal substances, 
each of which, as we shall see below, is an aggregate of monads.)
By contrast, in the case of beings by aggregation which have a true unity, namely in 
the case of corporeal substances, such as a man or an animal, their existence does not 
depend upon whether they are perceived or not; for their unity comes intrinsically from 
their souls. In other words, a soul makes a body be by unifying it. And since, as I have 
already remarked, a body can be divided into smaller bodies without end, and since 
each of them is unified again by its own soul, it follows that there are in a body an 
infinity of souls, although they are dominated by a ‘pre-eminent’ (G II 252/L 530)
19 Cf. Rutherford, ‘Phenomenalism and the Reality of Body in Leibniz’s Later Philosophy,’ p. 12 ff.
20 Ibid., p. 12.
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entelechy, which is the soul of this body; or, as Leibniz says in section 70 o f the 
Monadology, ‘each living body has a dominant entelechy which is the soul in the case 
of an animal; but the members of this living body are full of other living beings, plants,
and animals, each one of which also has its dominant entelechy or soul’ (G VI 619/L
21650). It is in this sense, I suppose, that a body, or more precisely, a living body, a 
corporeal substance, is a ‘compound’ substance— an ‘aggregate’ of monads; or, as 
Leibniz says in section 1 of the Principles o f Nature and o f Grace: ‘Compound 
substance is the assemblage of simple substances, or m onads’ (G VI 598/L 636); and in 
section 2 of the Monadology: ‘. . . the compound is nothing but a collection or 
aggregatum of simples’ (G VI 607/L 643).
Therefore, to speak more accurately, monads ‘are not really ingredients but merely 
requisites of matter’ (G II 451/L 604)— requisites for being as beings by aggregation 
which have a true unity, or even as beings by aggregation which lack a true unity; for 
without the former, the latter cannot be even as illusions or well-founded phenomena.
Incidentally, Rutherford has already observed that the relation between simple 
substances and bodies resulting from them is an ‘ontological’ one.22 The question now 
to be considered is, when Leibniz speaks of bodies not as aggregates of simple 
substances but as resulting from them, what does he mean by ‘result’? Nicholas Jolley, 
for example, suggests his meaning is that ‘a particular aggregate of monads appears to
21 He also says in a letter to De Voider of June 1699: ‘When you ask further if an animate body 
[corpus animatum; Loemker translates this phrase as ‘an inanimate body’; but I think that this is a 
mistake] has its own entelechies “distinct from the soul”, I reply that it has innumerable such 
entelechies, since it consists in turn of parts each of which is animated or as if animated’ (G II 184/L 
520).
22 Rutherford, ‘Phenomenalism and the Reality of Body in Leibniz’s Later Philosophy,’ p. 25.
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human observers as an extended physical object’;23 this is, indeed, in perfect accord 
with the misperception interpretation. On the other hand, Rutherford makes a different 
interpretation. He begins by quoting a definition of the term ‘result’ which is offered in 
a study from the 1680s by Leibniz himself: ‘I understand that to result [resultare], 
which can immediately be understood when those things from which it results have 
been posited.’24 And Rutherford says:
It is apparent from this definition that resulting is not a physical or causal relation. It is instead 
best understood as a relation of ontological determination. To say that a given being “results” 
from certain other beings is to say that its existence can be conceived as being immediately
25determined by the existence of those prior beings.
In other words, being prior to bodies, simple substances determine their being. And 
since without simple substances bodies cannot be, we may call these substances the a 
priori condition under which bodies can be—in short, the being, or more precisely, the 
beingness o f bodies.26 This is, I believe, what Leibniz has in mind when he says in a
letter to Amauld: \  . . there is no plurality without true u n itie s ................... the plural
presupposes the singular . . .’ (G II 97/M 191); in section 1 of the Principles: ‘There 
must of necessity be simple substances everywhere, for without simple substances there
23 Jolley, ‘Leibniz and Phenomenalism,’ p. 155.
24 Rutherford, ‘Metaphysics: The Later Period,’ p. 149.
25 Ibid., p. 149.
26 Strictly speaking, what makes a body be is the soul of this body. And in order for a soul to make 
its body be, it needs to dominate other souls contained within the parts of this body. I shall speak of 
this in more detail in Part Two.
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would be no compounds’ (G VI 598/L 636); and in section 2 of the Monadology: ‘There 
must be simple substances, since there are compounds’ (G VI 607/L 643).
The above interpretation, however, as Rutherford admits, does not exclude the 
misperception interpretation; for, as I have explained above, bodies which lack a true 
unity, in so far as their unity comes extrinsically from the mind of the percipient, remain 
misperceived, that is to say, illusions or phenomena, although well-founded by their 
component elements, by bodies which have a true unity. And it appears to me that 
Leibniz prefers to use the term ‘result’ especially in this case. For instance, he writes to 
De Voider in November 1703: ‘An aggregate is nothing save all those things considered 
at once, from which it results; and these naturally have their unity only from the mind 
on account of the things which they have in common, like a herd of sheep . . . ’27 (G II 
256); and in June 1704: ‘Accurately speaking, . . . matter is not composed of these 
constitutive unities but results from them, since matter or extended mass is nothing but a 
phenomenon grounded in things, like the rainbow or the mock-sun, and all reality 
belongs only to unities’ (G II 268/L 536). But on the other hand, as I have already 
quoted, he says: ‘Composite substances are those which constitute a unum per se, 
composed of a soul and an organic body, which is a machine of nature resulting from 
monads’ (G II 439/AG 199). In any case, there remains ambiguity in the thesis that 
bodies result from monads, unless we make a clear distinction between beings by 
aggregation which have a true unity and beings by aggregation which lack a true unity.
After having seen all of this, it is easy to understand how Aristotelianism and 
Platonism coexist in Leibniz’s philosophy. When we think of soul and body as two
27 Translated and quoted by Rutherford, ‘Phenomenalism and the Reality of Body in Leibniz’s Later 
Philosophy,’ p. 20.
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inseparable causes of one substance, that is to say, as form and matter, we are 
Aristotelian; and this is the position which Leibniz held in the Discourse and the 
Correspondence with Amauld, where he adopted the substantial forms of the Peripatetic 
Schoolmen. ‘If the body is a substance . . . he says, ‘we must necessarily conceive of 
something which is called substantial form and which corresponds in some sort to the 
soul’ (G II 58/M 135); for ‘a continuum is not only divisible to infinity, but every 
particle of matter is actually divided into other parts as different among themselves . . . .  
And since this could always be continued, we should never reach anything of which we 
could say, here is really a being, unless there were found animated machines whose soul 
or substantial form constituted the substantial unity independently of the external union 
of contact’ (G II 77/M 162). We may say then, that the substantial forms are what gives 
a substantial unity to a body and makes it be as a real being, or, as he puts it elsewhere, 
what ‘gives a definite being to matter’ (G II 119/M 222). When, therefore, he tried to 
‘rehabilitate’ (G IV 478/L 454) the substantial forms, his chief aim, it seems to me, was 
to clarify the being o f  a being; in other words, he seems to have sought to grasp being in 
its relation to that which is, a being. In this case, a being and its being are inseparably 
united in the former, just as a body and its soul are united in a corporeal substance; 
hence, his main interest during this period was in ‘corporeal substances’ composed of 
soul and body.
But on the other hand, if we separate the soul from its body, and conceive of the 
former as ontos on, what really is, and of the latter as me on, what really is not, we are 
Platonic; and this is the position of the later Leibniz, which is well expressed in the 
words: ‘. . . there is nothing in the world except simple substances’ (G II 270/L 537);
28 Garber, ‘Leibniz and the Foundations of Physics: The Middle Years,’ pp. 63 ff.
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and the body is now regarded, following Plato, as something like a shadow: \  . . in 
philosophical strictness,’ he says, ‘the body does not deserve the name of substance, a 
view which seems to have been Plato’s, who says that there are transient beings which 
never subsist longer than a moment’ (G VI 586/L 623). To put the matter ontologically, 
we may perhaps say that in his later years Leibniz gradually came to think of being 
i ts e lf  apart from beings; conversely, beings were, so to speak, alienated from their being 
and reduced to phenomena. Moreover, since he called being the ‘monad’ and spoke of it 
as a being, the monad became the only being which really exists. ‘. . . only simple 
things,’ he says, ‘are true things, and the rest are . . . phenomena . . .’ (G II 252/L 531). 
But if we speak with metaphysical strictness, the monad is not a being but the being of a 
being; and in so far as being is always the being of a being, it is not wholly separable 
from that which is. This is why he never abandoned corporeal substances, as some say 
he did. For instance, in section 63 of the M o n a d o lo g y  he says: ‘The body belonging to a 
monad which is its entelechy or soul constitutes what may be called a liv in g  b e in g  with 
that entelechy; with a soul it constitutes an a n im a l’ (G VI 617-8/L 649). In fact ‘the 
world of the M onadology ;’ as Garber rightly points out, ‘is as full of organisms as is the
29world of the C orrespondence w ith  A rnauld.'’
From this I draw a conclusion that in either case Leibniz’s thinking was orientated 
towards ‘being.’ In the D isco u rse  and the C orresp o n d en ce  w ith  A rn a u ld  he tried to 
grasp it as the being o f  beings, as ‘the basis of bodies’ (G II 58/M 135); whereas in 
after-years he was inclined to think of it a s  such, determining its essence as the unity of 
perception and appetition. He always employed, however, these two principles, being 
and beings, and laid greater emphasis upon the latter when he speaks of the substantial
29 Ibid., p. 62
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forms, and upon the former when he speaks of the monads. Therefore, it seems to me 
that the transition from the substantial forms to the monads is nothing else than this 
change in emphasis.30
Now, I have already shown that creatures are corporeal substances, basic beings in 
the monadological system, and that what constitutes their being (or their unity) is their 
soul.
Let us then consider the case of God more carefully. As we have seen at the 
beginning of this part, he is a spirit; if so, he is a principle of unity, or of being. A 
principle of unity is always accompanied by what is unified by it; and a principle of 
being by what is made to be by it. In the case of creatures, what is unified and made to 
be by their soul is their body. God, however, is without body. What, then, we may ask, 
does he unify and bring into being? The only answer to this question, it seems to me, is 
‘creatures,’ or more precisely, the whole of his creation, namely the world created by 
him. That is to say, God in creating the world unifies it and brings it into being.31 If this 
be so, it follows that the relation between God and the world corresponds in the 
monadological system to the relation between the soul and the body; just as a soul 
makes a body be by unifying it, so God makes the world be by unifying it. In short, God 
is to the world as the soul is to its body. This correspondence between the God-world 
relation and the soul-body relation will be discussed at greater length in the following 
two parts.
30 Cf. Brown, Leibniz, pp. 137 ff.
31 Although each creature is unified and made to be by its own soul, it is also unified and made to be 
by God. I shall argue this problem in Part Two.
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PART TWO
In the last part, we have concluded that the relation between God and creatures 
corresponds to the relation between the soul and the body. We have drawn this 
conclusion on the basis of our ontological determination of the relation between the soul 
and the body; that is to say, if God is a spirit, he must have something which is unified 
and made to be by him— this something is thought to be the world as the sum of all 
created beings; therefore he is to the world, as the soul is to its body.1
There is, by the way, a passage where Leibniz seems to acknowledge the parallel 
between the God-world relation and the soul-body relation. His words occur at the 
beginning of the essay On the Radical Origination o f Things, where he treats of God as 
the ultimate reason for the existence of the world: ‘Besides the world or aggregate of 
finite things, there is a certain One which is dominant, not only as the soul is dominant 
in me or rather, as the Ego itself is dominant in my body, but also by a much higher 
reason. For the dominant One of the universe not only rules the world but fabricates or 
makes i t . . . ’ (G VII 302/L 486). It is true that the relation between God and the world is 
different from the relation between a soul and a body, in that while God created the 
world, a soul finds its body already existing; but it cannot be denied that Leibniz here 
has in mind a similarity between the two relations.
Therefore we can consider the soul-body relation as a miniature of the God-world 
relation;2 and those determinations which are given to this miniature can be applied to
1 There follows from this correspondence a paradox that God has the world as his body; I shall, 
however, leave this paradox until we arrive at the next part.
2 Herbert Wildon Carr says: ‘The theory of Monads has its origin in a reflective meditation on the 
nature of mind and body and their union. The guiding thought is that in the mind-body relation we
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the original. In this part, then, I shall enter more minutely into the relation between the 
soul and the body, with the design of showing in more detail how it corresponds to the 
relation between God and creatures.
In the last part, we have grasped the relation between the soul and the body as 
identical with the relation between being and beings, with recourse to Heidegger’s 
ontological difference. Since a body can be divided into smaller bodies ad infinitum, it 
cannot by itself constitute a single being; it is, then, necessary for a soul to unify these 
bodies and to make them one; in this sense, the soul is the principle of the unity or 
being3 of its body. Thus, the soul and the body do not belong to the same sphere of 
being. If, therefore, we speak with metaphysical strictness, we cannot even say, e.g., that 
a soul has a body— for if a soul has a body, these two must belong to the same sphere of 
being. Nevertheless, the soul unifies its body. But this does not mean that the soul acts 
physically upon its body, but that the soul, as a dominant monad, dominates other 
monads which enter into the parts of its body; in other words, that it unifies its body 
through the medium of these subordinate monads. Therefore, the relation between the 
soul and the body cannot fully be comprehended as the relation between two terms; it 
consists, strictly speaking, of three terms: the dominant monad, its body and the 
subordinate monads contained within the parts of this body. That is to say, the relation 
between the soul and the body is the relation among the dominant monad, its body and 
the subordinate monads. For the sake of argument, however, I divide this relation in 
two:
have in miniature the God-world relation. If we can solve the mind-body problem, the solution will 
yield a metaphysics of reality in its full intension and extension’ (Leibniz, p. 84).
3 For Leibniz, as we have seen, ‘one and being are reciprocal terms’ (G II 97/M 191).
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1) the relation between the dominant monad and the subordinate monads;
2) the relation between the body of the dominant monad and the subordinate monads.
Let us begin with the relation between the dominant monad and the subordinate 
monads. The question now to be considered is, in what sense the dominant monad holds 
sovereignty over the subordinate monads, or in what sense the subordinate monads are 
in subjection to the dominant monad— in short, the meaning of domination and 
subordination is to be clarified. Leibniz, however, speaks very little of this; what we can 
refer to is his letter to Des Bosses of 16 June 1712, in which he writes: \  . . considered 
in the monads themselves, domination and subordination consist only in degrees of 
perfection’ (G II 451/L 605). That is to say, the dominant monad is more perfect than the 
subordinate monads. In regard to the perfection which monads have, Leibniz says: 
the soul . . . has perfection in proportion to the distinctness of its perceptions’ (G VI 
604/L 640; cf. G VI 615/L 647); in other words, the more perfect a monad is, the more 
distinct its perceptions are. If this be so, his meaning is probably that the dominant 
monad has more distinct perceptions than the subordinate monads have. Then we may 
ask: What do they perceive in a distinct or confused way? To this Leibniz gave us no 
answer; instead, Bertrand Russell suggests that it is what happens in their 
neighbourhood, namely in the body which specially pertains to the dominant monad, 
and within which the subordinate monads are contained:4
Leibniz is not very definite as to the meaning of domination, but the following seems to be his
4 Cf. Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, pp. 285 ff.
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meaning. Every monad perceives more clearly what happens in its neighbourhood than what 
happens at a distance. If, then, in a certain volume, there is one monad with much clearer 
perceptions than the rest, this monad may perceive all that happens within that volume more 
clearly than do any of the others within that volume. And in this sense it may be dominant over 
all the monads in its immediate neighbourhood.5
This interpretation of Russell’s is based upon the assumption that the relation of the 
dominant monad to the subordinate monads can be explained only through their 
perceptions especially harmonised with one another. There is textual evidence 
supporting this assumption; for instance, Leibniz writes in the same letter, which I have 
quoted above: \  . . I [do not] see what a dominant monad would detract from the 
existence of other monads, since there is really no intercourse between them but merely 
an agreement’ (G II 451/L 604). The ‘agreement’ here means, of course, the agreement 
of their perceptions, which is derived from the pre-established harmony.
But I wonder whether the relation of the dominant monad to the subordinate monads 
can be sufficiently explained in terms of the harmony of their perceptions; simply 
because, as we have seen in the last part, monads make up a unum per se under the 
domination of one monad, and this can never occur in the case of those monads which 
are free from such domination. To be sure, one can still say that this making-up of a 
unum per se is only the result of perceptions especially harmonised. But here, we might 
assume some kind of bond, which links up the subordinate monads, which is given by 
the dominant monad, and which never exists between the monads having no master to 
be obeyed. There is, indeed, ground for this assumption: Leibniz called such a bond
5 Russell, The Philosophy o f  Leibniz, p. 148.
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‘vinculum substantiate’— the substantial bond,6 which, according to him, is the same as 
‘what the Scholastics call a substantial form’ (G II 504/L 614; cf. G II 503/L 613), and 
always ‘adheres’ to the dominant monad (cf. G II 496/L 611). We may, therefore, 
identify it with the domination of the dominant monad over the subordinate monads.
In fact he remarks that monads make up a unum per se with the addition of a 
substantial bond, just as they do so under the domination of one monad: ‘Monads do not 
constitute a complete composite substance, since they do not make up a unum per se but 
merely an aggregate, unless some substantial bond is added’ (G II 444/L 
602)— although, he says, this bond causes no change in them: ‘The unity of corporeal 
substance in a horse does not arise from any ‘refraction’ of monads but from a 
superadded substantial bond through which nothing else is changed in the monads 
themselves’ (G II451/L 604). But it seems to me that this bond, although it has no effect 
upon monads themselves, establishes a relation between the dominant monad and the 
subordinate monads (cf. G II 439/AG 199)— a relation which is not perfectly explicable 
in terms the harmony of perceptions, but which requires ontological consideration. For, 
as we have just seen, by virtue of a substantial bond, monads can make up a unum per  
se, that is to say, a being. Therefore, if we accept the idea of the substantial bond, we 
will be able to explain the relation between the dominant monad and the subordinate
n
monads in a different way from Russell.
Now, as I have already shown, with the addition of a substantial bond, that is to say, 
under the domination of one monad, monads make up a unum per se, a being. This
6 On the theory of the substantial bond, see Part One, note 1.
7 Russell, as we have seen in Part One, does not accept the concept of the substantial bond as a 
genuine part of Leibniz’s philosophy. Cf. The Philosophy o f Leibniz, pp. 151 ff.
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being owes its beingness, or, it may be said, the fact that it is as it is, to these 
subordinate monads. We may say then, that they constitute the beingness o f  this being. 
But it is to be noted here that this constitution cannot be carried out except under the 
domination of the dominant monad, and is possible only through this domination. In 
other words, the dominant monad enables the subordinate monads to constitute the 
beingness of a being; in speaking thus, we may conceive of the dominant monad as the 
condition under which a being can be, that is to say, the condition o f the possibility o f  
being; for without it, the subordinate monads could not constitute the beingness of a 
being, and consequently there would be no being. On the other hand, we may conceive 
of the subordinate monads simply as the beingness o f  a being. Therefore, the relation of 
the dominant monad to the subordinate monads can be grasped as the relation o f the 
condition of the possibility of being to the beingness of a being.
We have already determined the relation between the soul and the body with 
recourse to the ontological difference, by which beings are sharply distinguished from 
their being. But, we are now facing a more complicated situation; for while, as we have 
seen, the dominant monad is to its body, as being is to a being, it is to the subordinate 
monads, as the condition of the possibility of being is to the beingness o f a being.
In order, therefore, to understand the relation between the dominant monad and the 
subordinate monads properly, I think it well— following, again, Heidegger— to divide 
the ontological difference into two kinds. The one is called the ‘transcendental 
difference’; this is the distinction of a being from its beingness. The other is called 
‘transcendence-related difference’ [transzendenzhafte Dijferenz]', this is the distinction
8 More will be said of this later.
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of the possibility of being from the beingness of a being.9 Thus, the relation between
9 Properly speaking, the transcendence-related difference is the distinction of the condition of the 
possibility of being from a being and its beingness. According to Max Muller (Existenzphilosophie 
im geistigen Leben der Gegenwart, S. 75-6), in the first elaboration of Division Three of Part One of 
Being and Time—of the division entitled ‘Time and Being,’ Heidegger distinguished the following 
three kinds of difference:
a) the ‘transcendental’ or ontological difference in the narrower sense: the distinction of a 
being from its beingness.
b) the ‘transcendence-related’ or ontological difference in the broader sense: the distinction of 
a being and its beingness from being itself.
c) the ‘transcendent’ or theological difference in the strict sense: the distinction of God from 
beings, from beingness and from being.
In after-years, Heidegger himself made the following marginal note on the title ‘Time and Being’ 
which appears in section 8 of Being and Time (p. 35):
The transcendence-related difference. (Joan Stambaugh translates ‘transzendenzhafte Dijferenz 
as ‘the difference bound to transcendence.’ But as I wish to translate ‘transzendenzhaft’ in one 
word, I use the expression ‘transcendence-related,’ which was suggested by my supervisor, 
Professor Sebastian Gardner.) The overcoming o f the horizon as such.
For Heidegger, being is ‘that which determines beings as beings, that in terms of which beings have 
always been understood no matter how they are discussed’ (Being and Time, p. 5). And it is time that 
makes possible this understanding of being; or, as Heidegger says: ‘. . . being is understood and 
conceptually comprehended by means of time’ {The Basic Problems o f Phenomenology, p 274); and 
when functioning as such a condition, time is called ‘temporality’; and thus temporality is ‘the 
condition of the possibility of all understanding of being’ {Ibid., p. 274; cf. Ibid., Part Two) or ‘the 
horizon of every understanding and interpretation of being’ {Being and Time, p. 15); it is that in 
which being consists, the essence of being, ‘being itself.’ In order, therefore, to thematise time or 
being itself—or, as Heidegger himself says, in order to overcome ‘the horizon as such’— we must 
needs transcend not only a being but also its being (or more precisely, its beingness):
We confront the task not only of going forth and back from a being to its being but, if we are 
inquiring into the condition of possibility of the understanding of being as such, of inquiring
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the dominant monad and the subordinate monads can be explicated by the 
transcendence-related difference.
On the other hand, the relation between the body of the dominant monad and the 
subordinate monads can be explicated by the transcendental difference; for, as we have 
seen, the subordinate monads constitute the beingness of the body of the dominant 
monad. But this relation is not to be confused with the relation between the soul and the 
body, which we have determined by the ontological difference between being and a 
being. For the soul, as contrasted with its body, is the dominant monad, and as such 
makes this body be; whereas the subordinate monads merely constitute the beingness of 
this body, and moreover they cannot do so without the dominant monad. (Or, we may 
say that when we considered the relation between the soul and the body in the last part, 
we cast the soul in the role not only of the dominant monad, but also of the subordinate 
monads. But now, we are considering the soul more carefully as the dominant monad, 
which is clearly distinguished from the subordinate monads.)
Now it is manifest that the relation between the dominant monad and the 
subordinate monads can be determined by the transcendence-related difference, while 
the relation between the subordinate monads and the body of the dominant monad by
even beyond being as to that upon which being itself, as being, is projected. (The Basic 
Problems o f Phenomenology, p. 282).
Because of this transcendence, ‘Time and Being’ requires the transcendence-related difference, by 
which time or being itself is distinguished from the being o f  a being. (I shall have a further 
opportunity to speak of this later.) This is why I resort to this difference in order to distinguish the 
condition of the possibility of being and the beingness of a being. (I am greatly indebted to Ryoichi 
Hosokawa’s book, The Range o f H eidegger’s Philosophy, for the above discussion; see ibid., 
especially, Parts One and Two.)
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the transcendental difference. It is therefore necessary to know something more about 
these two kinds of ontological difference. Heidegger himself obtained them from his 
unique interpretation of Plato’s theory of ideas.10 According to Heidegger, as we shall 
see shortly, the relation of the idea of the good and other ideas is explicable by the 
transcendence-related difference, and the relation between an idea and the thing which 
participates in it by the transcendental difference. Therefore, there must be a structural 
resemblance both between the relation of the idea of the good to other ideas and the 
relation of the dominant monad to the subordinate monads, and between the relation of 
an idea to the thing participating in it and the relation of the subordinate monads to the 
body of the dominant monad. In order, then, to show this resemblance, I wish here to 
outline Heidegger’s interpretation of the theory of ideas. After that, we shall return to 
our subject.
First of all, according to Heidegger, ‘the theory of ideas is ontology.’11 Ontology
12here means a science of being, and not of beings; it is ‘the theoretical conceptual
13interpretation of being, of being’s structure and its possibilities.’ By contrast, all other 
sciences ‘have as their theme some being or beings, and indeed in such a way that they 
are in every case antecedently given as beings to those sciences’;14 ‘they are posited by 
them in advance.’ 15 Therefore every science which is not ontological but, in
10 See, for example, Heidegger, Nietzsche, Plato's Sophist, Die Grundbegriffe der antiken 
Philosophie, The Basic Problems o f Phenomenology and Introduction to Metaphysics; see also 
Hosokawa, The Range o f Heidegger’s Philosophy, Parts One and Two.
11 Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie, S. 98.
12 On the distinction between being and beings, see Part One.
13 Heidegger, The Basic Problems o f Phenomenology, p. 11.
14 Ibid., p. 13.
15 Ibid., p. 13.
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Heidegger’s phrase, ‘ontical,’ is ‘a posting knowledge of beings and a positing attitude 
toward beings.’16 Just because of this difference, ontology is identified with what 
Aristotle calls ‘first philosophy’17— for he says at the beginning of Book IV of the 
Metaphysics:
There is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in 
virtue of its own nature. Now this is not the same as any of the so-called special sciences; for 
none of these others treats universally of being as being. They cut off a part of being and 
investigate the attribute of this part; this is what the mathematical sciences for instance do.18
That is to say, ontology is not an enquiry into such and such a being, but an enquiry into 
being: in Heidegger’s phrase, a ‘question of the meaning of being.’19 Therefore to say 
that the theory of ideas is ontology is the same as saying that it addresses the question of 
the meaning of being.
9 0For the Greeks, ‘being means ousia’; ousia, or more fully parousia, signifies
16 Ibid., p. 11.
17 Aristotle, Metaphysica, Book E, 1. 1026a 30.
18 Ibid., Book T, 1. 1003a 21 ff. Cf. Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations o f Logic, pp. 9 ff. But 
on the other hand, first philosophy is theology (cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica, Book E, 1); it is a science 
of an ‘immovable substance,’ that is to say, of God. In this case ambiguity arises in first philosophy: 
it is a science of being, while at the same time it is a science o f such a being as God. And here 
Heidegger sees ‘the onto-theo-logical constitution of metaphysics’ (cf. Heidegger, Identity and 
Difference, pp. 42 ff.). For the present, however, I wish to ignore this ambiguity, conceiving of first 
philosophy solely as ontology— even though I shall speak of God hereafter.
19 Cf. Heidegger, Being and Time.
20 Heidegger, Nietzsche: Volume TV, Nihilism, p. 161.
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‘presence,’ 21 ‘constant presence,’ 22 or ‘the presence of what endures in the
23unconcealed.’ And so Heidegger thinks that Plato interpreted ousia as idea. The 
Greek expression idea means the look of a thing. A thing presents itself in its look; 
therefore the look of a thing constitutes the presence of the thing. Thus, Heidegger says:
The word idea means what is seen in the visible, the view that something offers. What is 
offered is the current look or eidos of whatever we encounter. The look [Aussehen] of a thing is 
that within which, as we say, it presents [prdsentiert] itself to us, re-presents [vor-stellt] itself 
and as such stands before us; the look is that within which and as which the thing 
comes-to-presence [an-west]— that is, in the Greek sense, is.24
By the way, Plato’s interpretation of ousia as idea, according to Heidegger, has its
25roots in ‘productive activity,’ ‘the comprehension of being by way of production.’
26When, for instance, one makes a desk, one sights the model beforehand, and, in
accordance with it, makes a desk— that is to say, brings a desk into being; it is this
model that is what the Greeks call idea or eidos; or, as Heidegger says:
The potter forms a vase out of clay. All forming of shaped products is effected by using an
21 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 64.
22 Ibid., p. 216.
23 Heidegger, Nietzsche: Volume TV, Nihilism, p. 161.
24 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 192.
25 Heidegger, The Basic Problems o f Phenomenology, p. 105.
26 One sights this model beforehand, not by means of the eye as a particular organ of the body, but 
by means of ‘the soul’s eye.’ ‘Plato and Aristotle speak of omma tes psuches, the soul’s eye, which 
sees being.’ (Heidegger, The Basic Problems o f Phenomenology, p. 109.)
43
image, in the sense of a model, as guide and standard. The thing is produced by looking to the 
anticipated look of what is to be produced by shaping, forming. It is this anticipated look o f the 
thing, sighted beforehand, that the Greeks mean ontologically by eidos, idea. The shaped 
product, which is shaped in conformity with the model, is as such the exact likeness of the 
model.27
This is in accord with what Plato says in Book X of the Republic:
“Do you want us to make our consideration according to our customary procedure, beginning 
from the following point? For we are, presumably, accustomed to set down some one particular 
form [eidos] for each of the particular ‘manys’ to which we apply the same name. Or don’t you 
understand?”
“I do.”
“Then let’s now set down any one of the ‘manys’ you please; for example, if you wish, there 
are surely many couches and tables.”
“Of course.”
“But as for ideas for these furnishings, there are presumably two, one of couch, one of table.” 
“Yes.”
“Aren’t we also accustomed to say that it is in looking to the idea of each implement that one 
craftsman makes the couches and another the chairs we use, and similarly for other things? For 
presumably none of the craftsmen fabricates the idea itsel f . . .  .”28
27 Ibid., p. 106.
28 Plato, The Republic o f  Plato, Book X, 596 A-B.
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That is to say, making a couch, for example, means to look to the idea of couches 
beforehand, and to bring this idea to show itself in an actual couch; consequently, it is 
by this idea, that the actual couch is made to be seen as such, made to come to presence 
in its look, and therefore made to be;  or, as Heidegger says:
Something produced “is” because the idea lets it be seen as such, lets it come to presence in its 
look, lets it “be.” Only to that extent can what is itself produced be said “to be.” Making and 
manufacturing therefore mean to bring the look to show itself in something else, namely in 
what is manufactured, to “pro-duce [her-stellen]” the look, not in the sense of manufacturing it 
but of letting it radiantly appear [erscheinen]. What is manufactured “is” only to the extent that 
in it the look, being, radiates [er-scheint]. To say that something manufactured “is” means that
29in it the presence of its look shows itself.
29 Heidegger, Nietzsche: Volume I, The Will to Power as Art, p 176. Heidegger further holds that the 
comprehension of being by way of production was absorbed by the Schoolmen, who identified ‘to 
be’ with ‘to be created by God.’ For instance, he says:
. . . even if creation out of nothing is not identical with producing something out of a material 
that is found already on hand, nevertheless, this creating of the creation has the general 
ontological character of producing. Creation is also interpreted in some sense with regard to 
production. Despite its different origins, it was as if ancient ontology in its foundations and 
basic concepts were cut to fit the Christian world-view and interpretation of that which is as ens 
creatum. God as the ens increatum is the being which is absolutely without need of being 
produced and the causa prima of every other being. (The Basic Problems o f Phenomenology, pp. 
118-9.)
This view of Heidegger’s seems quite interesting and closely related to our subject— though we 
cannot enter into its detail.
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Up to now we have seen how the idea, as the look, constitutes the being (or more
precisely, the beingness) of a being. Plato, however, speaks further of the idea of ideas,
the highest idea, the idea of the good. In Book VI of the Republic he divides the region
of the intelligible from that of the visible, and analogises knowing ideas to seeing
things; and he insists that in addition to that which sees and that which is seen, there
should be a ‘third thing’ — a thing in the absent of which the sight can see nothing and
the colour cannot be seen. According to him, it is the light, or more precisely, the sun.
The sun is that under which the one who sees can see and all that is seen becomes
11visible; on this point, he says, it is ‘the offspring of the good’ — that is to say, ‘an
32offspring the good begot in a proportion with itself’; for the good is that by which the 
one who knows can know and all that is known becomes knowable, unconcealed and, in 
consequence, true. Thus, Plato says:
“Therefore, say that what provides the truth to the things known and gives the power to the one
3 3
who knows, is the idea of the good [he tou agathou idea].
Moreover, he thinks that the sun not only provides what is seen with visibility, but 
also with generation; correspondingly, he holds that the idea of the good not only 
provides what is known with knowability and unconcealment, but also with the 
possibility of being:
30 Plato, The Republic o f Plato, 507 C-D.
31 Ibid., 508 B.
32 Ibid., 508 B.
33 Ibid., 508 D-E.
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“I suppose you’ll say the sun not only provides what is seen with the power of being seen, but 
also with generation, growth, and nourishment although it itself isn’t generation.”
“Of course.”
“Therefore, say that not only being known is present in the things known as a consequence of 
the good, but also existence and being are in them besides as a result of it, although the good 
isn’t being but is still beyond being, exceeding it in dignity and power.”34
In regard to these words, Heidegger says in the first place:
The sun also confers warmth, through which the capacity for seeing and the visible things first 
become “beings,” or, in the Greek view, first become the kind of things that can each in its own 
way come to presence into the unconcealed. Correspondingly, the “idea of the good” is not 
only something that confers “unconcealment,” on the basis of which knowing and knowledge
•2 c
become possible, but is also what makes knowing, the knower, and beings as beings possible.
The idea of the good, idea tou agathou, makes beings as beings possible. As we have 
seen, a being is said to be, only to the extent that in it the idea, as the look, radiantly 
appears; and now, this appearance is possible only under the sun, that is to say, only 
through the idea of the good. Therefore, the idea of the good transcends all other ideas, 
all beingness; or, as Plato says: ‘the good isn’t being but is still beyond being [epekeina 
tes ousias].’ In regard to this, Heidegger says:
34 Ibid., 509 b .
35 Heidegger, Nietzsche: Volume TV, Nihilism, p. 168.
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The “good” here does not mean what is orderly in the moral sense, but the valiant, which 
achieves and can achieve what is proper to it. The agathon is the standard as such, what first 
grants being the potency to unfold essentially [wesen] as idea, as prototype. What grants such 
potency is the primally potent. But now, insofar as the ideas constitute being as ousia, the idea 
tou agathou, the highest idea, stands epekeina tes ousias, beyond being.36
The idea of the good lies even beyond being. It is the idea of ideas, the essence of ideas; 
in other words, the essence of being, being itself. And being itself grants being the 
ability to unfold itself as idea, and as such ultimately makes the being of beings 
possible: it is the condition of the possibility of being. Accordingly, Heidegger says:
. . . Plato conceives being as idea. The highest o f ideas, however— and that means at the same 
time the essence of all ideas— is the agathon. Thought in a Greek sense, agathon is what makes 
suitable, what befits a being and makes it possible for it to be a being. Being has the character
37of making possible, is the condition of possibility.
So much for Heidegger’s interpretation of the theory of ideas. Let us then sum up 
what has been said above. The relation of a thing to its idea is explicable by the 
difference of a being from its being (or beingness); and the relation of ideas to the idea 
of the good is explicable by the difference of the being (or beingness) of beings from the 
condition of the possibility of being, or being itself. As I have already mentioned, 
Heidegger calls the former difference ‘transcendental’; for through this distinction, we
36 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 210-11.
37 Heidegger, Nietzsche: Volume TV, Nihilism, p. 165-66.
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can surmount beings, thematising their beingness. On the other hand, he calls the latter 
difference ‘transcendence-related’; for, as we have just seen, being itself transcends not 
only beings but also their beingness; it is upon this transcendence that the difference is 
based.38
Returning to our subject, we may say that the relation between the dominant monad 
and the subordinate monads is comparable with the relation between the idea of the 
good and other ideas. For just as the idea of the good makes other ideas able to 
constitute the beingness of things, so the dominant monad makes the subordinate 
monads able to constitute the beingness of its body; in this respect the dominant monad 
has an affinity with the idea of the good, and the subordinate monads with other ideas. 
On the other hand, the relation between the subordinate monads and the body o f the 
dominant monad is compatible with the relation between an idea and a thing 
participating in it. For just as an idea constitutes, as a look, the presence or beingness of 
a thing participating in it, so the subordinate monads constitute the beingness of the
38 We can now clearly see why Heidegger had need of the transcendence-related difference in order 
to treat of ‘Time and Being.’ As has been briefly explained, time is the condition of the possibility of 
all understanding of being, and as such transcends not only a being but also its being; so that there is 
a close similarity between time and the idea of the good. Heidegger in fact speaks of the idea o f the 
good as the light in which one can see and grasp the being of a being, that is to say, as the condition 
of the possibility of the understanding of being:
. . .  seeing and grasping the being of a being requires a light; and this light, through which being 
as such is illuminated, is the agathon, the idea of the ‘good.’ Only in so far as there is an 
understanding of being, is a being accessible in its being. This understanding of being, 
according to Plato, is possible only because there is the idea of the good. . . . This agathon is 
epekeina tes ousias, lies, as it were, ‘even beyond being [iiber das Sein noch hinaus].’ (Die 
Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie, S. 256; cf. Heidegger, The Basic Problems o f  
Phenomenology, pp. 283 ff. and Hosokawa, The Range o f H eidegger’s Philosophy, pp. 79 ff.)
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body of the dominant monad. (There is, however, a subtle difference between these two 
relations: while each idea, separately from every other, constitutes the beingness o f all 
the things that participate in it, the subordinate monads together constitute the beingness 
of a particular body—that is to say, the body belonging to the dominant monad. This is 
somewhat concerned with the topic of the next part.)
These considerations may suffice for the determination of the relation between the 
dominant monad and the subordinate monads, and between the subordinate monads and 
the body of the dominant monad.
Now, according to the monadological system, there are throughout nature monadic 
domination and subordination. As Leibniz says in section 4 of the Principles, ‘not only 
is there life everywhere, joined to members or organs, but there are also infinite degrees 
of it in the monads, some of which dominate more or less over others’ (G VI 599/L 637). 
Moreover, it must be confessed that every created monad is at once dominant and 
subordinate; that is to say, that however dominant a monad is, it is at the same time 
dominated by a more dominant one. This can be applied not only to the souls of animals 
but also those of humans; for, as Leibniz says, ‘our soul, far from being the lowest of 
all, finds itself in the middle, from which one may rise or sink’ (G VI 543/L 588). 
‘Otherwise,’ he continues, ‘there would be a deficiency in order, or what some 
philosophers call a vacuum o f fo rm s’ (G VI 543/L 588). Therefore, every created monad, 
as a dominant monad, is analogous to the idea of the good, but as a subordinate monad, 
remains analogous to some other idea; in other words, it bears the two characteristics
39 Whence there will arise a possibility that humans (and all other creatures) are parts of a huge 
living organism which has a more dominant soul than they have— a possibility which is obviously in 
disaccord with Leibniz’s general position; I shall treat of this problem in Part Three.
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simultaneously.
There is, however, in the monadological system, one special monad, which is 
always dominant and can never be dominated by any other, and, in consequence, to 
which all created monads are subordinate— I mean God, who stands at the top of the 
monadic hierarchy; he is the most dominant or highest monad,40 and as such truly 
deserves the idea of the good.41 Unlike all other dominant monads, each one of which ! 
is the condition of the possibility of the being of its body, God is the condition of the 
possibility of the being of all bodies, that is to say, of the whole physical world; to put it 
more generally, he is the Creator of the world and as such what ultimately makes 
possible the being of all beings.
For instance, Leibniz speaks of God in the Discourse as ‘the principle and cause of
40 In the monadological system, no lowest monad exists, but the highest monad. Therefore, although 
this system can be extended downwards to infinity, it is closed by God when it is extended upwards; 
it is a closed system. From this there seem to follow several paradoxes, one of which I shall argue in 
Part Three.
41 God has been identified with the idea of the good: especially by Neoplatonists, by whom Leibniz 
was profoundly influenced in his youth, and whose doctrines, according to Christia Mercer, are ‘the 
primary source of his conception of God and the relation between God and creatures’ (Mercer, 
Leibniz’s Metaphysics: Its Origins and Development, pp. 174-5). Indeed, in section 28 o f the 
Discourse Leibniz is willing to accept the opinion that God is the sun (which, as we have seen, is 
proportional to the idea of the good) and the light of souls: with reference to ‘the Fathers, who were 
always more Platonists than Aristotelians’: ‘God is the sun and the light of souls— lumen illuminans 
omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum; and this opinion has not been invented only today. In 
addition to the Holy Scriptures and the Fathers, who were always more Platonists than Aristotelians,
I recall having observed long ago that at the same time of the Scholastics, several believed that God 
is the light of the soul and as they put it, the intellectus agents animae rationalis ’ (G IV 453/L 321). 
For a further discussion on the relation between Leibniz and Platonism, see Fouke, ‘Emanation and 
the Perfections of Being: Divine Causation and the Autonomy of Nature in Leibniz’ and Mercer, 
Leibniz’s Metaphysics: Its Origins and Development, Part Three.
51
all substances and all beings’ (G IV 461/L 326), ‘the origin of existences’ (G IV 461/L 
326); in the essay On the Radical Origination o f Things as ‘the ultimate reason for 
things’ (G VII 302/L 486); in the Theodicy as ‘the reason for the existence of the world’ 
(G VI 106/H 127); and in the Principles as the answer to the question: ‘Why is there 
something rather than nothing? (G VI 602/L 639)’ To be sure, according to him, all 
possibles or essences have a ‘certain urgency [exigentia] toward existence’ (G VII 303/L 
487) or a ‘pre-tension to exist’ (G VII 303/L 487; cf. G VI 603, 616/L 639, 648), and 
tend to exist in themselves (cf. G VII 303/L 487). But they are not able to come into 
existence by themselves— for none of them have reason for existence in themselves. 
Therefore, in order for possibles or essences to exist, there is required something which 
leads them to exist, something which produces them in the original Latin sense o f the 
word42— or, it may be said, something which bridges the gap between essence and 
existence. It is this something that is God— whose essence involves existence, and 
consequently who exists by absolute or metaphysical necessity (cf. G VII 303/L 487, G 
VI 602, 614/L 639, 647). Thus he is a ‘necessary being’ (G VI 602, 614/L 639, 647), 
and as such ‘makes possible the transition from essence to existence’43 (cf. G VII 407/L 
708).
Strictly speaking, however, this transition, as is well known, consists of three 
processes: firstly, by his understanding God knows all possible things, or things 
expressing an essence; secondly, by his will he chooses the best things out of them; and
42 ‘To accomplish means to unfold something into the fullness of its essence, to lead it forth into this 
fullness—producere ’ (Heidegger, Pathmarks, p. 239). Indeed, according to Leibniz, created monads 
are ‘products’ of God (G VI 614/L 647; cf. G IV 439 ff./L 311 ff.).
43 Translated and quoted by Nicholas Rescher, G. W. Leibniz’s Monadology: An Edition fo r  Students, 
p. 151.
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finally, by his power he brings these best things into existence: as a result, only the best 
exist in actuality (cf., for example, G VI 106 ff./H 127 ff.; G VI 616/L 648). Meanwhile, 
Leibniz recognises these three attributes in all created monads, and regards these 
monads as imitating God in a greater or less degree. For instance, he says in section 48 
of the Monadology: ‘There is in God the power which is the source of everything, there 
is also the knowledge which contains the variety of the ideas, and finally, there is the 
will which makes changes or products in accordance with the principle of the best. This 
corresponds to what is in created monads the subject or basis, the perceptive faculty, and 
the appetitive faculty. But in God these attributes are absolutely infinite or perfect, and 
in created monads or entelechies— or perfectihabies, as Hermolaus Barbarus translated 
this word—they are nothing but imitations in the degree to which the monad has 
perfection’ (G VI 615/L 647).
We may now interpret the above quotation thus: every created monad, as a dominant 
monad, has a resemblance to God; for it enables the monads subordinate to it to 
constitute the beingness of its body, and, by doing so, makes possible the being of this 
body. And this making-possible is expressed, as in the case of God, as an action; that is 
to say, firstly, by its perception each created monad perceives (or represents) possible 
things;44 secondly, by its appetition it desires only the best thing, leaving out all the
44 Perception, as Leibniz so defined, is ‘the representation of a multiplicity in what is simple (G III 
575/R 261; cf. G VII 529); in other words, by perception the monad, as the simple, represents in 
itself something multiple. But in order for the simple to represent the multiple, the simple must 
always precede the multiple in a metaphysical sense; to borrow Heidegger’s expression, it must 
‘anticipate [voraus sein]’ (The Metaphysical Foundations o f Logic, p. 90) the multiple which it 
represents. Thus the monad, as the simple, has the character of the a priori. According to Heidegger, 
Leibniz fully understood this by saying that the monad is ‘preeminent’ (G II 252/L 530; cf. The 
Metaphysical Foundations o f Logic, p. 90). If we borrow Heidegger’s expressions again without fear
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rest; and finally by its p o w e r 45 it brings this thing into practice.46 Among others,
of their strangeness, a monad must ‘reach out [ausgreifenf and ‘grip [umgreifenY the multiplicity in 
advance (cf. ibid., pp. 90 ff.). It is in this sense that I say that by perception a monad ‘perceives (or 
represents) possible things.’ By ‘possible things’ I mean the multiple anticipated or gripped in 
advance by the simple. For a further discussion of the Heideggerian interpretation of perception, see 
ibid., pp. 89 ff.
45 ‘Power’ here means the capability to integrate perception and appetition into action. In this ' 
capability, it seems to me, we can find a clue to Leibniz’s conception of being. ‘Power,’ he says, 
‘relates to being’ (G VI 107/H 127). Incidentally, Heidegger thinks that Leibniz interpreted the 
essence of the monad— which, for Heidegger, is the same as the essence of being— as the unity of 
perception and appetition, as the ‘representative striving [vorstellende StrebenY (Heidegger, The 
Metaphysical Foundation of Logic, p. 91; cf. Heidegger, Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence o f 
Human Freedom, p. 95); according to Heidegger, this interpretation of being as the representative 
striving can be traced back to Aristotle, who held noesis and orexis to be the basic faculties of living 
beings (cf. Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundation o f Logic, p. 91); and on the other hand it 
established the tradition of German philosophy, in which being is grasped as will. For instance, he 
says in his lecture on Nietzsche:
The conception of the being of all beings as will is very much in line with the best and greatest 
tradition of German philosophy. . . .  In one of Schelling’s most profound works, the treatise On 
the Essence of Human Freedom, published in 1809, that philosopher writes: “In the final and 
ultimate instance there is no other Being at all than Willing. Willing is Primal Being.” And in 
his Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) Hegel grasps the essence of being as knowing, but grasps 
knowing as essentially identical to willing. Schelling and Hegel were certain that with the 
interpretation of being as will they were merely thinking the essential thought of another great 
German thinker—the concept of being in Leibniz. Leibniz defined the essence of being as the 
original unity of perceptio and appetitus, representation and will. {Nietzsche: Volume I, The Will 
to Power as Art, pp. 34-5.)
Besides Schelling and Hegel, Kant, the founder of German idealism, divided human reason into 
theoretical and practical; Schopenhauer, taking over this view, wrote the book entitled The World as 
Will and Representation; and Nietzsche, being influenced by this book, spoke of ‘the will to power.’
46 ‘Substance is a being capable of action’ (G VI 598/L 636; cf. G IV 468 ff./L 432 ff.). The soul 
animates its body by action; in this sense the soul is the principle of the life or being of its body. 
Thus, to say that the soul unifies its body means that it actuates its body. For instance, Leibniz says
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however, spirits or rational souls, having these attributes in a preeminent way, finds 
themselves far closer to God; and thus they are often compared to ‘images of G od,’ or 
more straightforwardly, ‘little gods’: for instance, Leibniz says in section 5 of the New  
System: ‘. . . we must not mix up indifferently, or confuse, minds or rational souls with 
other forms or souls, for they are of a superior order and have incomparably more 
perfection than have the forms which are sunk in matter, which I believe are found 
everywhere. For in comparison with these, minds or rational souls are as little gods 
made in the image of God and having in them some ray of the light of the Divinity’ (G 
IV 479/L 454-5). This means that spirits, unlike other souls, know, will and 
act—imitating God consciously, in other words, serving him freely;47 or, as Leibniz
in an essay on Cartesian philosophy, written in 1702: \  . . this entelechy is either a soul or something 
analogous to a soul, and always naturally actuates [actuo] some organic body, which, taken 
separately, indeed, set apart or removed from soul, is not one substance but an aggregate o f many, in 
a word, a machine of nature (G IV 395-6/AG 252-3); and in a letter to De Voider of June 1703: 
‘When I say that even if it is corporeal, a substance contains an infinity of machines, I think it must 
be added at the same time that it forms one machine composed o f these machines and that it is 
actuated, besides, by one entelechy, without which it would contain no principle of true unity’ (G II 
250/L 529). Cf. Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, pp. 309 ff.
47 Here God is to be considered rather morally than metaphysically; or, as Leibniz says, ‘we must 
add morals to metaphysics’ (G IV 460/L 326). ‘That is to say,’ he continues, ‘we must consider God, 
not only as the principle and cause of all substances and all beings, but also as the head of all persons 
or intelligent substances and as the absolute monarch of the most perfect city or state, such as is the 
universe composed of all the spirits together, God himself being the most perfect of all spirits, as 
well as the greatest of all beings’ (G IV 460/L 326). As we have seen, God, as the idea of the good, 
transcends all being. This means, on the one hand, that he is the condition of the possibility of all 
being; but on the other hand it can mean also that he is what is superior to all being, what all being 
has not been yet, what all being ought to be— that is to say, the ought (cf. Heidegger, Introduction to 
Metaphysics, pp. 210 ff.). Therefore he is not only ‘the architect and efficient cause of our being’ but 
also ‘our master and final cause, who must be the whole end of our will and can alone make our 
happiness’ (G VI 623/L 652); he is ‘the Author of all good’ (G VI 622/L 652) or ‘the source of all
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says in section 36 of the Discourse: ‘Only spirits are made in his image and are, as it 
were, of his blood or like the children of his household, for only they can serve him 
freely and act with knowledge in imitation of the divine nature’ (G IV 461/L 327). Thus 
they are ‘architectonic’ in their actions; and in ruling their bodies they perform like God. 
As Leibniz says in section 14 of the Principles, ‘[t]he spirit not only has a perception of 
the works of God but is even capable of producing something which resembles them, 
though in miniature. For not to mention the wonders of dreams in which we invent, 
without effort but also without will, things which we should have to think a long time to 
discover when awake, our soul is architectonic also in its voluntary actions and in 
discovering the sciences according to which God has regulated things (by weight, 
measure, number, etc.). In its own realm and in the small world in which it is allowed to 
act, the soul imitates what God performs in the great world’ (G VI 604-5/L 640).
But on the other hand, every created monad, as a subordinate monad, remains
48remote from God; for it merely makes up a part of the body of the dominant monad.
It is this ambivalence—being at once dominant and subordinate— that constitutes 
the nature of created monads, and therefore that distinguishes them essentially from 
God.
Having once understood all of this, it is easy to see how the relation between the 
soul and the body corresponds to the relation between God and the world. Just as the
good’ (G VI 606/L 641), and thus ‘distributes his goodness’ (G IV 457/L 324) among all beings. But, 
as we have just seen, this is known only to spirits; and this is why Leibniz speaks of ‘the city of 
God,’ which is composed of all spirits and governed by him (cf., for example, G IV 461 ff., 485-6/L 
326 ff., 458; G VI 605 ff., 621 ff./L 640 ff., 651 ff.). I think that this ‘government’ (G VI 622/L 652) 
can provide us with a good model of the domination of the dominant monad over the subordinate 
monads; but we cannot enter into this detail.
48 I shall explain this in more detail in Part Three.
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relation between the soul and the body is the relation among the dominant monad, the 
subordinate monads and its body, so the relation between God and the world is the 
relation among God, created monads and the world; and just as each subordinate monad 
makes up a part of the body of the dominant monad, so each created monad makes up a 
part of the world. But here, it may be objected that such a conception of the relation of 
God to the world makes him ‘the world-soul’ which has the world as its body— the 
doctrine which Leibniz usually ascribes to Spinoza and consistently rejects. I have 
already suggested this objection several times; and now I have to devote myself to 
meeting it in detail. This will be attempted in the next part.
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PART THREE
In the last part, we have seen that if God is to the world as the soul is to its body, it 
follows that God is the world-soul which has the world as its body. Leibniz, however, 
does not accept such an idea. If this be so, how can we explain this paradox? In answer 
to this, I shall first of all consider why he rejects the doctrine of the world-soul or of a 
single universal soul, and then show that even though God, as the most dominant monad, 
is the world-soul, it does not contradict the theory of monads.
In the essay entitled Reflections on the Doctrine o f  a Single Universal Soul Leibniz 
describes this doctrine thus: ‘Some discerning people have believed and still believe 
today, that there is only one single spirit, which is universal and animates the whole 
universe and all its parts, each according to its structure and the organs which it finds 
there, just as the same wind current causes different organ pipes to give off different 
sounds. Thus they also hold that when an animal has sound organs, this spirit produces 
the effect of a particular soul in it but that when the organs are corrupted, this particular 
soul reduces to nothing or returns, so to speak, to the ocean of the universal spirit’ (G VI 
529/L 554). And in section 8 of the Theodicy he says: \  . . others . . . went so far as to 
advocate a universal soul forming the ocean of all individual souls, and believed this 
universal soul alone capable of subsisting, whilst individual souls are bom and die. 
According to this opinion the souls of animals are bom  by being separated like drops 
from their ocean, when they find a body which they can animate; and they die by being 
reunited to the ocean of souls when the body is destroyed, as streams are lost in the sea. 
Many even went so far as to believe that God is that universal soul, although others 
thought that this soul was subordinate and created. This bad doctrine is very ancient and
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apt to dazzle the common herd’ (G VI 54/H 78). The reason that he judges the doctrine 
of a universal soul to be ‘bad’ is, that it treats of individual souls as being bom  and 
dying— in a word, as mortal; such treatment of individual souls ends in denying their 
subjectivity and in accepting that God alone is a true substance— for a substance, as is 
commonly understood, must be imperishable.1 Something perishable, then, is not really 
a substance but merely a modification of it. Therefore, Leibniz often ascribes the 
doctrine of a universal soul to Spinoza, who, according to him, admitted only one 
substance which is permanent and divine, and regarded all the rest as its ‘evanescent 
and flowing modifications or phantasms’ (G IV 508/L 502). ‘Spinoza,’ he tells us, ‘who 
recognizes only one single substance, is not far from the doctrine of a single universal 
soul’ (G VI 530/L 554; cf. G IV 508-9/L 502).
On the other hand, Leibniz insists not only upon the plurality of substances, but also 
upon their indestructibility: ‘. . . monads,’ he says, ‘can only begin or end all at once, 
that is to say, they cannot begin except by creation or end except by annihilation’ (G VI 
607/L 643). And, besides, he holds that not only the soul but also the body is subsistent: 
‘. . . the souls and even the animals subsist always’ (G VI 545/L 590). To be sure, the
1 Strictly speaking, there is another reason for which Leibniz rejects the doctrine of the world-soul, 
and which can briefly be formulated thus: Since the world is infinite, it is not a whole; therefore it 
cannot be considered as an animal nor as a substance. For instance, he says in section 195 of the 
Theodicy: ‘. . . infinity, that is to say, the accumulation of an infinite number of substances, is, 
properly speaking, not a whole any more than the infinite number itself, whereof one cannot say 
whether it is even or uneven. That is just what serves to confute those who make of the world a God, 
or who think of God as the Soul of the world; for the world or the universe cannot be regarded as an 
animal or as a substance’ (G VI 232/H 249; cf. G II 304-5; G VII 399/L 702-3). I do not, however, 
treat of this reason in detail; instead, I shall show that even though God is the world-soul, he is in a 
particular way separated completely from the world, and therefore that the world is not itself a 
corporeal substance, nor, as Leibniz puts it, a ‘divine animal’ (G VII 399/L 703).
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body, being composed of parts, is decomposable and sometimes becomes so small as to 
be hardly perceptible; but he believes that it cannot be detached completely from its 
soul. Thus he says that ‘organic bodies are never without souls,’ and that ‘souls are 
never separated from organic bodies’ (G VI 545/L 590). He thinks also that his doctrine 
of pre-established harmony has firmly established this fact; for in advocating it he has 
shown ‘that the soul with its functions is something distinct from matter but that it 
nevertheless is always accompanied by material organs and also that the soul’s functions 
are always accompanied by organic functions which must correspond to them and that 
this relation is reciprocal and always will be’ (G VI 533/L 556). Consequently, he says 
in section 73 of the Monadology: ‘. . . there is never complete generation or, strictly 
speaking, perfect death, consisting in the separation of the soul. What we call 
generation is a development and an increase, just as what we call death is an 
envelopment and a diminution’ (G VI 619/L 650).
This being so, it is obvious that the monadological system is not compatible with the 
doctrine above described, that is to say, which advocates that individual souls should 
return, after the destruction of their bodies, to the ocean of a universal soul. But if this 
doctrine allows the plurality of substances and therefore the subsistence of individual 
souls, it will itself be acceptable; for in this case one only speaks of God as a universal 
spirit. In fact Leibniz says: ‘In itself the doctrine of a universal spirit is good, for all who 
teach it recognize in fact the existence of divinity . . . .  But to go so far as to say that this 
universal spirit is the only spirit and that there are no particular souls or spirits, or at 
least that these particular souls cease to subsist, is, I believe, to exceed the bounds of 
reason and to advance, without any basis, a doctrine of which we have not even a 
distinct concept’ (G VI 530-31/L 555). And as we have seen, even though God occupies
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the position of the most dominant monad, of the world-soul, each one of created 
monads, which are subordinate to him, maintains, as a dominant monad, autonomy and 
independence, and subsists as long as God does (cf. G IV 485-6/L 458; G VI 598/L 636). 
Therefore, we cannot simply identify, under the pretext of God as the highest monad, 
the theory of monads with the doctrine of a universal soul which Leibniz rejects.
I have made these remarks, because Kuno Fischer has actually made such 
identification, claming that the conception of God as the highest monad leads to the 
doctrine of the world-soul, ‘which,’ he says, ‘goes definitely against the spirit of 
monadology.’2
Let us then examine briefly how Fischer has come to put forwards such a claim. He 
points out that there is an antinomy in Leibniz’s concept o f God. His argument is as 
follows. Firstly, as the highest monad, God is without limit, that is to say, without body. 
Secondly, however, in the monadological system, as I have already observed, the 
relation of the soul to its body corresponds to the relation of God to the world; and, 
besides, souls are always accompanied with organic bodies. Thirdly, therefore, such a 
monad as God, i.e., as has no body, is not really a monad. In consequence, these two 
propositions contradicting each other can be accepted at the same time: ‘God is a 
monad’ and ‘God is not a monad.’ Here are Fisher’s words:
God was the highest monad and as such had to be conceived as being without all limit and 
matter. Wholly immaterial as he is, God finds himself out of natural connexion with the world,
2 Fischer, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Leben, Werke und Lehre, S. 615. See also Robert Latta’s 
comment on section 70 of the Monadology; Leibniz, The Monadology and Other Philosophical 
Writings, p. 257.
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thus being absolutely distinguished from all other beings. That opposition o f the material and 
immaterial, which Leibniz attempted to resolve into the relation between the soul and the body, 
now presses between God and the world. But then it is a necessary condition o f every 
individuality to be with limit and matter; and this is the nature o f every monad. An unlimited 
monad, therefore, is a monad which is not really a monad. In this apparent contradiction is the 
Leibnizian concept of God. Both are accepted: the proposition, ‘God is a monad,’ and its 
contradictory opposition: ‘God is not a monad.’ In this antinomy the Leibnizian teaching of 
God wavers also in its expressions.3
But it is inconceivable that God is not a monad; for, as Leibniz says, he is ‘the 
primary unity or the simple original substance of which all the created or derivative 
monads are products’ (G VI 614/L 647; cf. G VII 502). Thus we are constrained to 
accept only the proposition that God is a monad;4 but, Fischer says, this conception of
3 Ibid., S. 613/4.
4 On the contrary, Russell dismisses the idea that God is a monad, on the score of a ‘wide gu lf’ 
between God and created monads (The Philosophy o f Leibniz, p. 187); and as to the passages in 
which Leibniz speaks of God as a monad (G III 636; G VII 502), he regards them as ‘slips’ (The 
Philosophy o f Leibniz, p. 187). But as far as I can judge, even if God is distinct from created monads 
toto genere or infinitely, there remains a continuity between them; otherwise Leibniz would not say 
either that ‘every substance is . . . like a mirror of God’ (G IV 434/L 308), or that creatures bear in 
themselves the character of the Creator (cf. G IV 428/L 304). As I have already shown, God, as the 
most dominant monad, is the condition of the possibility of the being of all beings. But this does not 
conflict with the idea that God is a monad; for, as we have seen, each created monad, as a dominant 
monad, does the same thing as God does, though in miniature. By the way, what if God is not a 
monad? According to Fischer, God will become an ‘unlimited substance’ (Fischer, Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz: Leben, Werke und Lehre, S. 615), which is lacking in personality, and from which all 
created things emanate without moral necessity (see ibid., S. 615; cf. G IV 439/L 311 ff.; G VI 614/L 
647); such a concept of emanation, as gives up not only God’s self-determination but also creatures’ 
independence (see ibid., S. 615), ‘looks like,’ Fischer says, ‘Spinozism’ (ibid., S. 615). Erdmann had
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God makes him the world-soul which has the world as its body. He begins by 
confirming the correspondence between the relation o f God to the world and the relation 
of the soul to its body, views God as monas monadum,5 and concludes that God is ‘the 
world-soul in the world-body’:
According to the rudder of the teaching of monads, God must be to other beings, as the 
dominating monad is to the subordinated monads, as the highest monad is to the lower monads 
and as the soul is to its body. In this consideration God is called ‘monas monadum’; he is the 
perfect soul in the perfect body, the world-soul [Weltseele] in the world-body [Weltkorper].6
To which I have two points to argue. Firstly, even though, in the monadological 
system, the relation of God to the world corresponds to the relation of the soul to its 
body, it does not necessarily follow from this that God has the world as his body. For, as 
we have seen, the relation between the soul and the body, strictly speaking, is the
already pointed out that ‘when Leibniz is serious about the dependence o f created monads upon God, 
their substantiality is threatened to disappear and he approaches Spinozism’ (Versuch einer 
wissenschaftlichen Darstellung der Geschichte der neuern Philosophic, Band IV, S. 63). Russell has 
taken over this view of Erdmann’s when he says that ‘Leibniz, whenever he treats God at all 
seriously, falls involuntarily into a Spinozistic pantheism’ (The Philosophy o f Leibniz, pp. 185-6). I 
shall, however, advance a view different from theirs.
5 According to Russell, this traditional expression ‘monas monadum’ is not to be found in Leibniz’s 
writings. ‘It was used by Bruno,’ he informs us, ‘from which it used to be thought that Leibniz got 
the word monad’ (The Philosophy o f Leibniz, p. 187). ‘This fact,’ he continues, ‘seems to have led 
Hegel to suppose that Leibniz also used the phrase, and subsequent writers, with the exception of 
Erdmann, seem to have rashly assumed that Hegel had some authority for the supposition’ (Ibid., p. 
188). From these things Russell draws the conclusion that God is not a monad. ‘Thus,’ he says, ‘it is 
better not to regard Leibniz’s God as one among monads . . . ’ (Ibid., 188).
6 Fischer, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Leben, Werke und Lehre, S. 614.
63
relation among the dominant monad, its body and, most important, the subordinate 
monads; in other words, the subordinate monads mediate, as it were, between the 
dominant monad and its body. And by dominating them, the dominant monad has its 
body, not immediately but mediately; those which have this body effectively and 
immediately are the subordinate monads, which are contained within its parts. (And, of 
course, each of these subordinate monads, again, as a dominant monad, has its own 
body through the medium of the monads subordinate to it; and this process goes to 
infinity. Therefore, speaking strictly in a metaphysical sense, no monad, in so fa r  as it is 
a dominant monad, has its body immediately; this is why, as we shall see below, God, 
being always predominant, is entirely detached from his body.) Fischer, however, 
conceives of the relation between the soul and the body simply as the relation between 
two terms, without realising that this relation, in the monadological system, is the 
relation among three terms. This is evident from the fact that in the above quotation he 
treats of the relation between the soul and the body as the same as the relation between 
the dominant monad and the subordinated monads; but these two relations are not the 
same thing.
Secondly, therefore, even though God is the world-soul in the world-body, this body 
is distributed, as it were, among created monads, which are subordinate to him; and in 
this distribution, he finds himself entirely detached from his body (cf. G VI 619/L 650). 
Moreover, because of this detachment, he alone is 'actus purus' (G II 325), being 
‘above all matter’ (G VI 546/L 590); this is why Leibniz calls God ‘substantia 
supramundana’ (G II 259) or ‘intelligentia supramundana’ (G VII 358 ff./L 679 ff.).
Whence it follows clearly that although God be the highest monad, namely the 
world-soul, this does not go against the spirit of monadology.
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It can be seen also from what has just been said, why Leibniz, writing to Bourguet, 
who doubted that there is an affinity between the theory of monads and Spinozism, 
could declare with confidence: ‘I do not see how you can deduce any Spinozism from 
this . . . .  On the contrary, it is through these very monads that Spinozism is 
destroyed . . .’ (G III 575/L 663). For Leibniz grasped the relation between the soul and 
the body, not dualistically, but in view of a third which plays an intermediary role 
between the two; and it is this very third that made him far removed from 
Spinozism—according to which God has the world as its body immediately, and 
according to which there is only one corporeal substance which is divine and 
permanent; in contrast with such a theory, he distinguished God from the world by 
making created monads mediate between the two. That is to say, on the one hand, every 
creature is close to God, in so far as it is a dominant monad and leaves its body to the 
monads subordinate to it; but on the other hand, every creature is remote from God and 
remains a part of nature, in so far as it is a subordinate monad and makes up a part of 
the body of the dominant monad. It is thus that creatures are at once divine and natural, 
and, so to speak, the compounds of God as the purely spiritual and nature as the purely 
material; and herein, I think, lies the essence of the relation between God and creatures 
in the monadological system.
By these considerations, I believe, I have thrown some light upon the subject. Now, 
I should like to conclude this thesis, which is so long that I have never written before, 
and which I have written in a foreign language, with the lines of Manilius prefixed by 
Leibniz as a motto to the Theodicy:
. . .  Quid mirum, noscere Mundum
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Si possunt homines; quibus est et mundus in ipsis, 
Exemplumque Dei quisque est sub imagine parva.
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